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Abstract: This article proceeds from a way of thinking about legal-rights 
reasoning that is grounded in the rhetorical tradition. In light of questions 
of political legitimacy and personal ethics, a central premise of the article 
is that the rhetorical enterprise must situate itself within a paradigm of 
dialogic communication in which mutual persuasion is the orientation to 
argument and the quest for intersubjective validation of claimed premises, 
lines of argument, and conclusions is the purposive mode. The first step in 
the article is to move from a general conception of law as a field of 
rhetoric to an account of how such a conception can be a useful way of 
thinking about both the nature of (human) rights – assisted by the 
analytical account of the nature of rights advanced by Joseph Raz – and 
the interpretive processes of meaning-giving that go on within the 
international human rights treaty orders.  The article then develops an 
account of representational diversity that builds on previous work on a 
notion of “interactive diversity of knowledge” and that situates such 
diversities as a sine qua non for the legitimate judicialization of 
interpretive authority in any legal order, but especially in the international 
realm. To accomplish this, the argument first reminds readers of the 
central problem of representation within an interstate conception of 
international human rights law that was first identified and grappled with 
by Hersch Lauterpacht as the dust of the Second World War was settling – 
how to justify granting the power of judgment (whatever its formal force) 
to an international human rights body in light of objections that such 
judgment represents an unjustifiable imposition from ‘outside’ a state and 
its society.  The Lauterpacht concern with the representation of states on 
international bodies is then complemented by a perspective that draws 
lightly on the theories of process and authority of Myres McDougal and 
Harold Lasswell and on notions of counterfactual assent such as are 
associated with the communicative theorizing of Jürgen Habermas.  It is 
ii 
argued that the central question of representation in evolving international 
human rights law should be one that leaves behind the implicit image of an 
international body as a surrogate for interstate deliberation.  Instead, an 
approach is needed that locates the persuasive authority of international 
human rights bodies in a double conception of what is termed rhetorical 
responsibility: at one level, international human rights adjudication as a 
kind of microcosm of transnational dialogues over human rights in which, 
alongside representational concerns tied to political geography, non-state 
representational diversity is valued and given shape by purposive accounts 
of the point(s) of the international human rights enterprise; and, at another 
level, of international human rights adjudication as an enterprise that 
cannot ultimately be divorced from personal ethos and existential decision 
on the part of judges or analogous decision-makers.  In a brief and 
deliberately tentative concluding section, it is hypothesized that the extent 
to which a (both) transnationalized and personalized idea of international 
human rights judging -- animated by an ideal of dialogical universalism – 
can overcome legitimacy concerns based on societal sovereignty in a still-
state-ordered world can only be understood alongside an account of two 
key framing variables.  The first variable is the nature and degree of the 
formal power of an international body to bind states and other actors to its 
judgments.  The second variable is the extent to which a body can 
plausibly present itself as playing a ‘constitutional’ role vis-à-vis the 
community of actors to whom its judgments are addressed. 
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DIVERSE PERSUASION(S): FROM RHETORIC TO 
REPRESENTATION (AND BACK AGAIN TO RHETORIC) 
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INTERPRETATION © 
 
Craig Scott* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article proceeds from a way of thinking about legal reasoning that has 
been aptly described as “the other of philosophy,” namely, the rhetorical 
tradition.1 Within law as a rhetorical enterprise, the underlying purpose is 
the persuasion of a given audience or interpretive community that an 
interpretation or application of the law is just, legally correct, or meets 
whatever other standard is meaningful for achieving implied or actual – or, 
as will be discussed in Part 5 of this article, perhaps only constructed – 
assent from that group of people.2 Legal reasoning is about the giving of 
                                                 
© 2001-2008. This work was originally written in 2001 as a commissioned piece for an 
edited book.  By 2006, the book had entered its final editorial stage, but, due to the nature 
of contributions from other authors, had quite radically changed the overall thematic and 
subject-matter direction.  Although the present article was intended by that book’s editor 
to continue as the book’s capstone chapter because its intellectual framework was felt to 
have significance for fields of international law beyond international human rights law 
‘proper’, the author came to the conclusion that the book’s subject-matter was too far 
removed and reluctantly withdrew the piece from the book with the consent of the editor. 
The present version essentially represents a 2002 edit, along with some updating in 2006.  
Before submission for publication as an article, some deepening of the final section – in 
light of new literature published since 2001 that is relevant to the general observations 
made in that section – is expected.  
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto; Director, 
Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security.  The author 
would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for 
its generous financial support, and Nuri Frame for his ever-able research assistance.  
Comments are welcome to cscott@osgoode.yorku.ca.  
1 Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis 
107 (1987). 
2 See Jennifer Nedelsky & Craig Scott, Constitutional Dialogue, in, Social Justice and the 
Constitution (Joel Bakan & David Schneiderman, eds., 1992). Note that even in the field 
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reasons, about choice of values in contexts of uncertainty and of a 
multiplicity of relevant principles, about the persuasive force of mutually 
supportive justificatory arguments arranged as a coherent whole.  And, as I 
hope to show, the most desirable conception of rhetoric – in law at least – 
is not as a unidirectional phenomenon.  Least of all should rhetoric be 
conceptualized as an instrumental practice that sees an author of a juridical 
act or legal text treating her audience in effect as an obstacle to be 
overcome by such methods as determining what that person or group 
‘wants or needs to hear’  so that authorship becomes in significant part a 
matter of encoding a message in such a way that the audience responds 
more viscerally than reflectively in accepting the import of the message.  
Rather, once questions of political legitimacy and personal ethics push 
matters beyond a linguistic sociology of legal reasoning into the realm of 
political and moral desirability, rhetoric must justify its existence.  Thus it 
is that a grand premise of this article is that the rhetorical enterprise must 
situate itself within a paradigm of dialogic communication in which 
mutual persuasion is the orientation to argument and the quest for 
intersubjective validation of claimed premises, lines of argument, and 
conclusions is the purposive mode.3  
                                                                                                                         
most associated with inductive and deductive reason, science, Kuhn has demonstrated 
that the scientific method proceeds by persuasion within the assumptions and parameters 
set by paradigms (often employing logical and empirical forms of reasoning the validity 
of which depends on the premises from which they proceed) and also across adherents of 
different paradigms. See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (3d ed., 
1996). 
3 I do not intend, at least in this essay, to establish the pedigree of the notion of law as 
rhetoric, except to say that there are several strands of public international law that 
emphasize the argumentative, judgmental, communicative, or rhetorical nature of 
international law. Those who are self-consciously rhetorical would include Ilmar 
Tammelo, The Law of Nations and the Rhetorical Tradition of Legal Reasoning Indian 
Y.B. Int’l L., 227 (1964); Lyndell Prott, The Latent Power of Culture and the 
International Judge (1979); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the 
Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic 
Affairs (1989); and Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive 
Communities, 12 Mich. J. Int’l L. 371 (1991). Another thinker whose work I feel falls 
somewhere within the rhetorical tradition would be Oscar Schachter by virtue of his 
emphasis on normative multiplicity, law as a practice of justificatory argument, and the 
(in)validating roles of communities of judgment: see, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Invisible 
College of International Lawyers 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 217 (1977); Oscar Schachter, 
International Law in Theory and Practice (1991).  Note also the emphasis in Myres 
McDougal, Harold Lasswell & James Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and 
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The specific goal of this article is to move from such a general alignment 
with the notion of law as a field of rhetoric to an account of how such a 
conception can be a useful way of thinking about both the nature of 
(human) rights and the interpretive processes of meaning-giving that go on 
within the UN and other human rights treaty orders.   Once these accounts 
are set out, in Part 2 and Part 3 respectively, I then seek to develop in Part 
4 an account of representational diversity that situates it as a sine qua non 
for the legitimate judicialization of interpretive authority in any legal 
order, but especially in the international realm. To approach the question 
of representation in our times, I will first remind readers of the central 
problem of representation within an interstate conception of international 
human rights law that was identified and grappled with by no less a 
scholar than Hersch Lauterpacht just over a half-century ago – how to 
justify granting the power of judgment (whatever its formal force) to an 
international human rights body in light of the mix of principled and 
emotive objections that such judgment represents an imposition from 
‘outside’ a state and its society. 
 
Having done this in Part 4, I then juxtapose to the Lauterpachtian concern 
with the representation of states on international bodies, a perspective in 
Part 5 that draws on the work of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell.  I 
will suggest that the central question of representation in evolving 
international human rights law should be one that leaves behind the 
implicit image of an international body as a surrogate for interstate 
deliberation.  Instead, we must substitute an approach that locates the 
persuasive authority of international human rights bodies in a conception 
of international human rights adjudication as a kind of microcosm of 
transnational dialogues over human rights in which, alongside 
representational concerns tied to political geography, non-state 
representational diversity is valued and given shape by purposive accounts 
of the point(s) of the international human rights enterprise. 
 
Part 6 is a brief and deliberately tentative concluding section. I suggest 
that the extent to which transnationally conceived international human 
                                                                                                                         
World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (1967) on the communicative 
nature of international law and the centrality of intersubjective consensus in interpreting 
international law. 
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rights judging can overcome legitimacy concerns based on societal 
sovereignty in a still-state-ordered world can only be understood alongside 
an account of two key framing variables.  The first variable is the nature 
and degree of the formal power of an international body to bind states and 
other actors to its judgments.  The second variable is the extent to which a 
body can plausibly present itself as playing a ‘constitutional’ role vis-à-vis 
the community of actors to whom its judgments are addressed.  
 
II. RIGHTS AS RHETORICAL REASONS 
 
A. A NARRATIVE-ANALYTICAL ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE OF 
RIGHTS 
 
I begin with a kind of narrative of Joseph Raz’s analytical account of the 
nature of rights in which he offers a definition and elaborates various 
features and reformulations of that definition.4 While perhaps not 
attracting general acceptance,5 Raz’s analysis is persuasive in my opinion 
in that it captures salient formal features of the actual invocation of rights 
in moral and political practical reasoning.6 Here I am assuming that a clear 
                                                 
4 Joseph Raz, On the Nature of Rights, 93 Mind 194 (1984) [hereinafter Raz, On the 
Nature].  See also Joseph Raz, The Nature of Rights in his The Morality of Freedom 165 
(1986) [hereinafter, Raz, Morality]. The latter is largely identical to the article except for 
an added treatment of Ronald Dworkin’s notion of rights as trumps at 186-192. See 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (2d prtg.1978), corrected, with appendix, esp. 
90-94, 364,. For an earlier article by Raz which takes issue with various features of 
Dworkin’s account of rights, see Joseph Raz, Professor Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 26 
Political Studies 123 (1978). For Dworkin’s reply, see Ronald Dworkin, Appendix: A 
Reply to Critics in Taking Rights Seriously, id. 290, 364-368 [hereinafter, Dworkin, A 
Reply]. 
5 See, e.g.Michael Perry, Morality, Politics and Law: A Bicentennial Essay 308 (1988). 
6 Raz’s enterprise is to focus on the form of rights claims that he feels straddles otherwise 
antagonistic substantive theories: 
 A successful philosophical definition of rights illuminates a tradition of political 
and moral discourse in which different theories offer incompatible views as to what rights 
there are and why. The definition may advance the case of one such theory but if 
successful it explains and illuminates all. 
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analytical rendering of the formal nature of rights claims can be a useful 
exercise in helping us understand the way rights seem to operate in a 
variety of social or linguistic contexts. Furthermore, Raz’s approach has 
influenced my thinking for well over a decade,7 and therefore I feel 
virtually compelled to start my own account of rights with his. 
 
Raz’s basic definition of the existence of a right is in the following form: 
“‘x has a right’ if and only if x can have rights, and, other things being 
equal, an aspect of x’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for 
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.”8 He also puts this 
somewhat more descriptively in terms of the “fundamental role of rights in 
practical reasoning as representing concern for the interest of the right-
holder to hold another subject to a duty.”9 Raz goes on to say that rights 
not only ground duties, but also other rights, the relationship between the 
core rights and its derivatives being “a justificatory one” as opposed to a 
relationship of logical entailment.10 He continues: 
 
A right is based on the interest which figures essentially in the justification 
of the statement that the right exists. The interest relates directly to the 
                                                                                                                         
 Raz, On the Nature, supra note 4 at 195. Compare to Dworkin’s approach in 
asking what the ‘point’ of an account of rights is, as opposed to whether the account is 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’, and thus giving an account that is in some sense a ‘stipulation’. While 
he contrasts this method to Raz’s alleged penchant for theorizing about rights in terms of 
seeking an “empirical discovery [through] captur[ing] ordinary language exactly or 
completely”, it would seem to me that the work by Raz focused on here does not have 
such strong aspirations and would not deny its own stipulative features. See Dworkin, A 
Reply, supra note 4 at 366. 
7 Admittedly in ways that Raz is not responsible for and almost certainly in ways that he 
might very much regret or at least not recognize as having much to do with his own 
views. 
8 Raz, On the Nature, supra note 4 at 195. 
9 Raz, Morality, supra note 4 at 188. 
10 Raz, On the Nature, supra note 4 at 197, adding: 
 The statement that the derivative right exists must be a conclusion of a sound 
argument (non-redundantly) including a statement entailing the existence of the core 
right. 
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core right and indirectly to its derivatives. The relation of core and 
derivative rights is not that of entailment, but of the order of justification.11 
 
Raz’s conception of rights is intimately connected to an account of their 
actual functioning in practical discourse: how it is that they are invoked in 
real-world-language encounters (granting that this real world includes the 
ruminations of other rights theorists). According to this view of rights as 
social practice, rights are something that we justify through a process of 
reason-giving, as structured by argumentative conventions and practices. 
In perhaps the key passage in the original article by Raz, he explains how 
rights function linguistically to help make conversation possible, 
especially over controversial values: 12 
 
[T]he interests are part of the justification of the rights which 
are part of the justification of the duties. Rights are 
intermediate conclusions in arguments from ultimate values 
to duties. They are, so to speak, points in the argument where 
many considerations intersect and where their results are 
summarized to be used with additional premises when need 
be. Such intermediate conclusions are used and referred to as 
if they are themselves complete reasons. The fact that 
practical arguments proceed through the mediation of 
intermediate stages so that not every time a practical question 
arises does one refer to ultimate values for an answer is of 
crucial importance in making social life possible, not only 
because they save time and tediousness, but primarily because 
they enable a common culture to be formed round shared 
intermediate conclusions, in spite of a great degree of 
haziness and disagreement concerning ultimate values.13 
 
                                                 
11 Id. at 198. 
12 Note that in the account that follows I am deliberately using a narrative technique of 
italicizing so as to draw the reader’s attention to those features of Raz’s account that tie 
into the understanding of rights for which I hope to make a case, namely, the notion of 
rights as rhetorical seats of argument and the associated notion of rights as sites of 
dialogue. 
13 Id. at 208 (emphasis added). 
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From this extended passage, we see that we argue from interests and 
values to rights, and from there to duties. So, to paraphrase, in any given 
argument that involves rights, we argue both about rights and from rights. 
Rights are “intermediate conclusions” or “points in [an] argument” even if 
rights are nonetheless often invoked in knowing irony, “as if” they were 
“complete reasons.” Raz’s implication seems to be that they do not 
actually function in this way (that is, as complete reasons). 
 
We might think of this notion of the completeness of reasons in terms of 
looking backward and then forward from the right in question. Looking 
backward, so to speak, from a right, we see that a right is not complete in 
the sense of somehow being the beginning of a claim, or, put in the most 
essentialist way, of being a separate feature of the linguistic world. Even 
more significantly, the right is not a complete reason in the sense of its 
normative worth being independent of the background interests and values 
that generate it. Raz’s approach to rights is to locate them in terms of the 
service they perform as linguistic labels for sufficiently important 
interests. Sufficiency will vary with the context, whether we are talking 
about ‘ultimate’ moral and political importance for candidates for 
entrenchment in human rights treaties and constitutional bills of rights or 
functional importance within the presuppositions of a specific area of 
statutory regulation. However important or weighty the interest, he 
emphasizes that the right thereby generated has no greater weight or 
importance than the background interest.14 The ‘right’ is a linguistic 
resting point, no less important for being that but no more important 
either. 
                                                 
14 Rights do not “have force over and above the interests they serve. . . . In fact rights 
should have precisely the force which the interest has.” Raz, Morality, supra note 4 at 
262. Raz contends that the misperception (in his view) of those who wish to speak of 
rights as having acquired greater status for being rights is based on confusing the rights 
with the special force given to a rights claim by virtue of an authoritative institutional 
decision (e.g. by a court or legislature) on what is required by the right – where that 
decision creates a reason to act on the obligee as long as the decision-maker is generally 
legitimate and even if the obligee feels that the decision in the particular case is ‘wrong’, 
id. 
 I would add that one other reason that rights (human rights at least) are seen and 
used as if they have more importance than the interests underlying them is the widespread 
associations of rights with notions of natural law and rights and of more or less Platonic 
conceptions of rights as being ‘out there’ in a moral universe. 
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Looking forward from the right, the above-quoted passage suggests that 
saying ‘I have a right’ does not do away with the need to show why, how, 
and subject to what conditions that right places obligations on others. 
There are “additional premises” that come into play in the argument from 
the underlying interest to a duty (whether abstract or concrete). This is so 
even if the speaker, in making the assertion, quite evidently (and, I might 
add, quite consistently) believes that the existence of the right is sufficient 
to ground the duty of (an)others to act or refrain from acting. Raz points 
out that we argue (forward) from rights, as “intermediate conclusions”, to 
duties which then go on to function as “requirement[s] for action.”15 Just 
as rights are not the start of the argument, nor are they the end of the 
argument. 
 
This sense that argument only ends when the obligation is justified 
suggests a notion of the fluidity of rights in their ‘location’ between 
interests and duties.16 Until such an obligation is argued for, the right’s 
‘existence’, as well as its implications for duty-required action, is a matter 
for argument. Of course, to the extent that we make our lives easier by 
speaking with rights – and, thus, not referring explicitly to generative 
interests, on the one hand, or generated obligations, on the other hand – we 
may not think of ourselves as speaking through rights.  These kinds of 
rights-based conversations are, however, likely to be in areas of deeply, or, 
perhaps simply widely, shared understandings or, if the rights conversation 
involves seriously contentious issues, within narrowly circumscribed 
communities of conversation in which those participating are substantially 
like-minded on those issues. Thus, the invocation of rights not as “points 
in [an] argument” but as self-standing and complete assertions is a double 
                                                 
15 Id. at, 297. 
16 And, I might add tangentially at this point, between persons (including between one 
person and society as a whole). Raz’s conception of rights as intermediate conclusions in 
arguments from interests of some persons to duties on others strikes me as doing justice 
to both the analytical and the metaphorical claim that rights should be understood in 
terms of relationships. See notably Elizabeth Kiss, MARX AND RIGHTS: A 
CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS THE DEFENCE OF RIGHTS AS INSTRUMENTS, 
(1989) (D. Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford) (for a primarily analytical account of rights 
as relationships) and Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationships I:1 Rev. 
Const. Stud. 1 (1993) (for a primarily metaphorical account). 
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function of a context of obviousness to the invoker and the like-
mindedness of the audience addressed.17 
 
So, people may and do invoke rights as complete or dispositive reasons 
because they believe in the merits of their claim (that their interests are 
sufficient to ground obligations in others). In many moral and legal 
traditions, people rarely invoke rights ironically, that is, to use Raz’s 
words, “as if” they were complete reasons. When looked at more broadly 
from the perspective of the overall social practice of rights invocation as 
contrasted to the first-person perspective of the claimant, however, any 
dispositive effect can only occur at the end of further arguments about 
which duties are justified. Consistently with this, Raz speaks of the duties 
generated in rights argumentation as having dispositive effect, not the 
rights. On Raz’s understanding, “[d]uties are special in the role they 
assume in practical reasoning. Their role cannot be captured by the usual 
weighing metaphor which applies to the evaluation of ordinary reasons. 
The[y] have pre-emptive force.”18  Later, he points out that “rights have 
special force” only because they are grounds for duties “which are 
peremptory reasons for action”.19 
 
It is important at this juncture that some further aspects of Raz’s 
framework understanding of rights be noted to make the preceding clear, 
especially since Raz displays some ambiguity on the issue of how directly 
                                                 
17 Rights as self-evident claims is parasitic on a particular legal, social and general 
linguistic context, including in an adjudicative context that relies on existing case law on 
what interests have been accepted to underlie rights and what obligations have been 
found when this right has been invoked in the past. 
18 Raz, Morality, supra note 4 at 186. Raz links the pre-emptive force of duties to the role 
of legitimate authorities in issuing decisions translating rights into obligations which the 
addressee is bound to carry out. He defines “pre-emptive” in terms of “replac[ing] rather 
than compet[ing] with (some of) the other reasons which apply in the circumstances.” 
19 Id. at 249. Thus, a concern I would express about Dworkin’s choice of the metaphor of 
rights as trumps. To this point, it would at best be justified to speak of duties as trumps. 
Note, however, the further caveat implicit in Part 6, infra, where I suggest that we still 
need to de-trumpify even duties by circumscribing either-or accounts of authority and by 
importing insights from research which shows the inevitable to-and-fro nature of the 
remedial process in judicial or quasi-judicial rights review. 
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a right is a ground for a duty.20 He advances a notion of ‘right’ which 
suggests that, in practical thought and usage, we speak of the ‘existence’ 
of general or core rights even if we do not know in advance what 
derivative rights ‘exist’ in concrete cases or what obligations will be 
generated by the core right (or a derivative right, once justified) in 
concrete cases. In other words, Raz takes the view that a right ‘exists’ if 
we know (from some chronologically prior or simply assumed set of 
arguments) that it represents interests sufficiently weighty to justify 
holding some other societal actor under an obligation or obligations at 
least some of the time. If conflicting considerations are (at least in the state 
of current knowledge, societal beliefs, morals and so on) always weighty 
enough to defeat the argument about the contended-for core or derivative 
right, then the right does not exist at all.21 On this understanding of rights, 
some rights are very heavy, while others are very light; some rights are 
fundamental, others close to trivial. 
 
So, we can say within this framework that the meanings of rights is almost 
always underdetermined and inchoate. They ‘sit’ there in a text or popular 
consciousness or a discursive field ready to be used as a source of 
argument in future concrete contexts. For Raz, part of this inchoateness of 
rights involves their capacity to generate multiple obligations even on the 
same facts, so that, for instance, a right might require abstention from 
other citizens and positive action from the government.22 But perhaps the 
                                                 
20 This ambiguity is displayed when one sees that Raz elsewhere says, in the concluding 
last paragraph of the chapter in The Morality of Freedom: 
 According to our account the special features of rights are their source in 
individual interest and their peremptory force, expressed in the fact they are sufficient to 
hold people to be bound by duties. 
Id. at 192 (emphasis added). 
21 Id. at 211-12. For example, most would say that no circumstances exist in Canada in 
which a constitutional right to own a submachine gun would be recognized by the courts, 
whereas, in the constitutional context of another country (that south of the Canadian 
border), a significant percentage of the population and judiciary might well say the right 
exists even if its scope and acceptable limitations are subject to further debate. 
22 Id. at 210: “Just as rights may impose duties on some persons and not on others, so 
they can impose a duty to do certain things but not others. . . .” Raz, Morality, supra note 
4 at 209-10: “[E]ven if a person has a right, not everyone is necessarily under an 
obligation to do whatever will promote the interest on which it is based.” 
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most interesting implication of Raz’s approach is that rights are constantly 
resonating into the future. As Michael Perry has evocatively put it, one 
way to view at least some constitutional bills of rights is as akin to “sacred 
texts” that “constantly disturb – . . . serve[] a prophetic function in – the 
life of the community.”23 Raz makes a similar point by linking a notion of 
unknowability to the dynamism of the obligations that rights ground: 
 
A right of one person is not a duty on another. It is the ground 
of a duty, a ground which, if not counteracted by conflicting 
considerations, justifies holding that person to have the duty. . 
. . [T]here is no closed list of duties. . . . This dynamic aspect 
of rights, their ability to create new duties, is fundamental to 
any understanding of their nature and function in practical 
thought . . . .24 
 
[T]he implications of a right, such as the right to education, 
and the duties it grounds depend on additional premises and 
these cannot in principle be wholly determined in advance. . . 
. Because of this rights can be ascribed a dynamic character. 
They are not merely the grounds of existing duties. With 
changing circumstances they can generate new duties.25 
 
In summary, within the Razian framework, we have, I would contend, a 
rich notion of rights as concepts which have an active function in practical 
discourse as opposed to rights simply as labels for static interests. We have 
also a notion of rights as ways of arguing from interests and ultimate 
values to obligations on others in concrete social circumstances: rights 
make no sense outside discursive communities and outside contexts in 
which we can carry on a conversation about what rights we and anyone 
among us have and what responsibilities are therefore owed by some 
amongst us to others amongst – or adjacent to – us.  Finally, we have a 
sense of rights as functional in a particular form of practical activity 
                                                 
23 Perry, supra note 5 at 147. It should be made clear that Raz is not talking about such 
fundamental rights only, but much of his discussion is clearly influenced by this context. 
24 Raz, Morality, supra note 4 at 199 (emphasis added) 
25 Id. at 212 (emphasis added). 
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known as ‘judging’, whatever institutional form such judging might be 
connected to: 
 
[I]f an individual has a right, then a certain aspect of his well-
being is a reason for holding others to be under a duty. I used 
this phrase advisedly to preserve the ambiguity between 
saying that rights are a reason for judging a person to have a 
duty, and saying that they are reasons for imposing duties on 
him. They are in fact reasons of both kinds, but primarily of 
the first.26 
 
Latent within this contrast between imposition and judgment seems to be a 
notion that the primary function of rights is one of persuading – that 
rights-based reasons make sense and are meaningful to the person on 
whom the obligation is found to rest – rather than of serving as a vehicle 
for one actor to bind another actor to the former’s unilateral dictates. This 
observation leads us to a more explicit discussion of rights as rhetorical 
locations. 
 
B. OVERLAPPING UNDERSTANDINGS OF RIGHTS: POINTS IN AN 
ARGUMENT AND RHETORICAL REASONS 
 
The purpose of this present section is to relate Raz’s account of rights in 
argument to the tradition of rhetoric, discussed briefly in the introduction, 
according to which legal reasoning (no less than moral or political 
reasoning or, for that matter, even scientific reasoning) is best seen, inter 
alia, as a process of reason-giving in a world in which value-laden 
judgment is not derivable from a monistic source, but is rather a subject of 
constant contestation in a world of diverse and incommensurable goods 
and value systems. Classical and ‘new’ rhetorical traditions emphasize 
several key notions.27 Among these are the notions of topoi and inventio. 
                                                 
26 Id. at 200. 
27 Amongst the classics are Cicero, Topica, (H. M. Hubbell trans., Harvard University 
Press 1960) and Aristotle, Rhetoric and Topica, (E. S. Forster trans., Harvard University 
Press 1966). On the ‘New Rhetoric’, see Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on ARGUMENTATION (1969).  And, accessible, albeit 
condensed, versions of Perelman’s vast work, see Chaim Perelman, The New Rhetoric 
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The former term, topoi, refers to ‘seats of argument’ – premises that 
“provide appropriate starting points for the discussion of a problem with 
which the actors or judges are confronted.”28 The latter term, inventio, 
refers to the process of “finding the right premises”29 or, in other words, 
the process of settling on the specific topoi from which argument can then 
proceed within a particular interpretive enterprise. 
 
Human rights arguments often employ rights simultaneously as rubrics for 
a process of inventio and as topoi. In challenging a particular action or 
state of affairs (let us take, for instance, the chronic underfunding of 
shelters that protect women from domestic violence), arguments both 
assume that the existence of the right needs to be argued for and assume 
the independent existence of the right in arguing the implications of its 
existence. Sometimes the two seemingly contradictory assumptions 
coexist in one argumentative web, while sometimes the formal legal 
framework helpfully specifies their analytical separation. This point can 
perhaps be illustrated by way of the example of the normative structure of 
some rights in treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), which attach explicit limitations clauses to some rights, and of all 
the rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), which treaty contains a generally applicable limitations 
clause.  To use the ICESCR as our reference point, its Article 4 reads: 
 
                                                                                                                         
and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and its Applications (1979) [hereinafter 
Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities]; Chaim Perelman, The Realm of 
Rhetoric (1982); and Chaim Perelman, Justice, Law and Argument (1980). It is worth 
noting the consanguinity of philosophies of practical reason and theories of argument 
with the rhetorical tradition, although such philosophies are almost never self-consciously 
in the rhetorical tradition. See for instance a work that has shaped much of my own 
understanding of the rhetorical dimensions of reasoning, Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of 
Argument (1964).  Also, of perhaps more than anecdotal interest is the enthusiastic 
foreword by written by HLA Hart for Justice, Law and Argument, id..  In terms of 
intellectual consanguinity, note also the proximity in time amongst Hart’s The Concept of 
Law (1961), THE Uses of Argument, and the original French version of The New 
Rhetoric (1958). 
28 See Kratochwil, supra note 3 at 41. The ‘seats of argument’ metaphor is Cicero’s. 
29 Id. 
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The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in 
the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in 
conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject 
such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law 
only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of 
these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare in a democratic society. 
 
A right in the ICESCR, such as Article 12’s right to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, could be said to function in terms 
of inventio at the definitional stage of argument. For example, is there ‘in’ 
Article 12 – standing alone or read in light of Articles 2(2) and 3 on the 
equality rights of women – a core or derivative right to adequate support 
services for battered women generated by their health interests? In this 
process, we usually argue about the right in terms of whether a concrete 
right can be derived (in Raz’s sense of derivation) from an abstract textual 
provision such as the “right to health.” We argue from underlying interests 
and broad systemic values that we feel are projected by (or immanent in) 
the document (for example, “the inherent dignity of the human person” 
mentioned in the ICESCR’s preamble and the “democratic society” 
referenced in Article 4) and engage in some kind of teleological analysis 
of the right in question. At this point, the right (or, more accurately, the 
interpreted understanding of its scope) stands as an “intermediate 
conclusion” or “point in the argument”, to use Raz’s terms, in an argument 
that is not yet finished.  
 
The right itself then goes on to function independently as a place of 
argument, or topos, in the justificatory debate within Article 4 (to stick 
with the ICESCR example) over whether any infringement of the right so 
defined may be justified in a “democratic society.”  At the end of this two-
stage process, we determine whether an obligation to respect, protect, or 
ensure the right has been breached. In this argument, we have already 
acknowledged and are proceeding on the assumption that a right ‘exists’ 
and, indeed, has been interfered with or infringed beyond a threshold level 
of acceptability, and now we wish to ask self-consciously whether such 
infringement is justified by “conflicting considerations”, to pick up again 
on Raz’s terminology. While it is true that the two stages can collapse into 
one another, due in large part to the result-oriented nature of judicial 
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reasoning,30 the correspondence of Raz’s analytical distinction with the 
manner in which the ICESCR and much of international human rights 
treaty law encourage this approach offers significant support for the 
contention that Raz has properly understood the functioning of rights in 
normative discourse.  
 
The two-stage analytical distinction based on the ICESCR’s structure 
helps us, for instance, to think of core societal understandings or well-
established judicial interpretations of rights as operating primarily as topoi 
in argument within Article 4 (as well as within wider social and political 
discourses) – not just places of argument but commonplaces of argument. 
It also helps us think of claims on the periphery of such understandings 
and interpretations to be about rights as both inventio (the first stage of 
argument) and then as independent topoi (the second stage). That said, it 
would be naïve to think that, in practice, the inventio and topos stages of 
an ICESCR argument are truly isolated, especially given that there is 
found in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR a generic obligation on states that 
applies to all ICESCR rights, the duty to “take steps . . . by all appropriate 
means.” Especially where a rights instrument places obligations of a 
specified actor at the centre of discourse, it will be inevitable that 
arguments about what the content of a concrete right is will often be 
phrased in terms of the specific obligations that are appropriate to place on 
the actor.   
 
Let us illustrate this point narratively using the hypothetical of violence 
against women in the family.  On the two-stage account, a process of 
inventio may produce consensus that violence against women in the 
                                                 
30 I would even be willing to say ‘result-initiated’ in that my observations of the judicial 
process from the inside (as a clerk with the Supreme Court of Canada), as well as my 
conversations with several European Court of Human Rights judges, suggest to me that 
judges, especially in cases involving major value conflicts and policy implications, start 
with an intuitively preferred result – which admittedly can contain an implicit summary 
of what the judge already understands the law and her function to be – and then seek to 
see whether there are persuasive ‘legal’ reasons that sustain that result. If, in the end, the 
available reasons seem too unpersuasive, then a judge will (reluctantly) agree to another 
result. See Prott, supra note 3, whose interviews with ICJ judges also tend to confirm this 
approach.  More generally in terms of working with result-initiated reasoning as central 
to a theory of adjudication, see Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de 
siècle (1997). 
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‘private’ sphere is included within the harms protected against by the 
general right to health, but a further analysis is required in which that 
rights norm serves as topos (of whatever agreed weight) for deciding 
whether, in light of such “conflicting considerations” as the state may 
raise, an “appropriate means” to secure this right is for states to take steps 
(with whatever degree of urgency) to establish shelters to which women 
can flee to safety.  However, once such a conclusion is reached, the 
obligation generated on states can easily circle back on the very 
specification of the right at issue, such that a core right to health that 
includes a right not to be subjected to family violence comes to be spoken 
of as including the means of securing that right by the duty-holder (i.e. the 
provision of shelters).  In this way, a kind of reflexive spiral can be a 
feature of the process of first ‘inventing’ the right and then deciding what 
obligations are generated by that right while holding the right constant (as 
topos ‘competing’ with the countervailing topoi invoked as limitations on 
the right). If we think of the path from interests to rights to duties in terms 
of actual cases heard by tribunals, the progress of the spiral will depend on 
what is being asked for in a specific case and subsequent cases, and/or 
what tribunals are willing to recognize by way of obligations flowing from 
asserted rights.  For example, we might imagine two alternative versions 
of a first test case.  In version 1, the spiral will wind its way more slowly 
than in version 2.  In version 1, the litigants have decided that they only 
want to achieve a solid first precedent that declares that the right to health 
includes the right not to be subjected to domestic violence and that they 
simply want a court to declare that such a right exists and that the state 
must take steps by appropriate means to secure that right; their intent is to 
then use such a modest victory in a subsequent case that will invoke the 
right not to be subjected to domestic violence in order to place a duty on 
the state to provide adequate shelters.  In version 2, the litigants have 
decided to shoot higher and seek, in one case, a declaration from the court 
not only that there is a right not to be subjected to domestic violence but 
also that this generates an obligation on the state to take steps towards 
constructing adequate shelters. If a court agrees, it may, for example, issue 
a declaration to that effect and may further ‘put the government to means’ 
so as to require, at the same time as permit, the state to decide the features 
of a shelter program.   
 
Let us assume that the version 2 test case then comes to stand in general 
discourse for recognition not just of the right not to be subjected to family 
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violence but also the even more specific right to access to a protective 
shelter. Within some months or years, different groups look at the 
precedent and what has transpired since by way of state policy and 
legislation.  Group A decides to go to court in order to build on the 
recognition of the right not to be subjected to family violence and not 
focus on specific obligation found to exist in the test case; they wish to 
invoke the right as the basis for a duty on the state to provide 24-hour 
police protection for women whose spouses are under restraining orders 
but who have either breached the order or threatened to do so.  If they 
succeed, their case may come to stand for a right to police protection from 
threatening spouses and take its place alongside the other precedent 
involving the right to shelters.   Group B decides to go to court and invoke 
not simply the abstract right to health nor the more specific right not to be 
protected against domestic violence but rather the even more concrete 
right to adequate shelters.  Imagine, for example, a passage of time during 
which the state has established a program that meets the needs of most 
urban women but of few rural women. Group B’s case is to argue that the 
right to a shelter extends to placing an obligation on the state in areas 
where there is less of a ‘critical mass’ of women and, as a corollary, higher 
budgetary costs associated with providing reasonable access. Meanwhile, 
a third group, Group C, invokes the right to battered-women’s shelters not 
in order to seek further specification of the duty on ‘the state’ but to argue 
for an allocation of duties as amongst different state actors – e.g., in a 
federal system, as amongst the municipal, provincial or state, and federal 
levels of government.  Time passes and cases on other rights (e.g. freedom 
of expression) have begun to argue that it is not only state actors but also 
‘private sector’ actors that have obligations directly under the rights 
instrument in question, what is often referred to as the ‘horizontal’ 
application of human rights norms.  Imagine that some initial judgments 
have accepted that corporations are bound to help secure the right to 
freedom of expression by making sure less powerful social groups have 
their views, voices, and analyses adequately represented in news delivery 
and programming.  Group D decides to invoke the health-violence-shelter 
case law and go to court to argue that housing development companies 
have an obligation to set aside a certain percentage of planned housing 
space for battered-women’s shelters in any new sub-division of a certain 
size, and to build in the costs of such shelters into the costs of the housing 
units.  Group D may decide to cast the case as one of ‘diagonality’ 
whereby the purpose of the case is to establish that the right to shelters 
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places a joint obligation on both the development companies and the local 
council with zoning powers.31   
 
It is hoped that the above narrative of a hypothetical course of litigation, 
beginning with the right to health and moving through various stages of 
concretization of derivative rights and of obligations of duty-holding 
actors, conveys the ways in which the actual practice of rights 
argumentation is both consistent with the Razian analytical 
interests→rights→obligations path and with constant feedback processes 
that result in the spiralling mutation of rights as topoi and inventio.  The 
narrative was intended to show how arguments about a right (does the 
right to health, and the interests underlying it, include the right not to be 
subjected to domestic violence?) and from a right (articulated at a certain 
level of generality, e.g. the right not to be subjected to domestic violence) 
to concrete obligations can circle back and end up operating as processes 
of inventio for a more concrete right (e.g. the right to adequate battered-
women’s shelters) than was initially used to generate those obligations. In 
this way, we arrive back at a fluid rhetorical understanding of human 
rights as ‘spaces’ within which debates about individual (and group) 
interests and fundamental societal values are addressed in terms of 
notional and actual argument over what action is (or is not) required by 
what actors – in the ICESCR context, primarily, if not exclusively, by 
states – to secure (respect, protect, and fulfil) those interests and values in 
concrete contexts. Such a conception and its emphasis on the 
argumentative construction of meaning promotes an understanding of 
rights which emphasizes the contingent and dynamic, as opposed to the 
timeless and static, nature of the rights.32 
                                                 
31 On the notion of diagonality, see Craig Scott, Towards the Institutional Integration of 
the Core Human Rights Treaties, in Reaching Beyond Words: Giving Meaning to 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Valerie Oosterveld & Isfahan Merali eds., 2001) 
7, 31-35. 
32 Recall Raz on the dynamic generation of obligations through rights argumentation. A 
very similar idea of the dynamic and rhetorical quality of rights has been put forward by 
Martha Minow in the context of constitutional rights adjudication in the United States: 
 Legal rights . . . should be understood as the language of a continuing process 
rather than the fixed rules. Rights discourse reaches temporary resting points from which 
new claims can be made. . . . Rights in this sense are not ‘trumps’, but the language we 
use to try to persuade others to let us win this round. 
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III. PRINCIPLES AND PREMISES IN TREATY 
INTERPRETATION 
 
A. THE RHETORICAL SCHOOL OF TREATY INTERPRETATION 
 
Having schematically set out a case for seeing rights as possessing a 
special rhetorical role in normative language, I wish now to draw attention 
to work done several decades ago by German legal scholar Ilmar Tammelo 
in which he convincingly elaborates the notion of international treaty law 
as a rhetorical enterprise. Tammelo begins by noting various sceptical 
commentaries on the non-constraining nature of rules of treaty 
interpretation.33 His response is to argue that sceptics have approached 
                                                                                                                         
Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 Yale L. J. 1860, 1876 
(1987). 
 Note, however, that the idea of ‘winning this round’ contains within it trumplike 
imagery for a concrete case. In this sense, ‘dialogue’ as an alternative to ‘trump’ is aimed 
more at a rights-claim as part of a process than it is aimed at the effect of having recourse 
to the law in a concrete case.  But, even then, this returns us to Raz’s notion of rights 
functioning “as if” they were “complete reasons” and still obscures the fact that the 
trumping effect only occurs as a result of an authoritative decision (as to the existence of 
a particular obligation that has been breached) being made at the end of a process of 
argument in which the right functions as a middle term that has to engage with other 
considerations before the obligation is produced. As well, Raz’s framework specifically 
allows for a wide variation in the weight to be accorded rights in that second stage 
argument, which would also seem to be at odds with an understanding of rights as 
complete reasons or trumps on collective justifications. 
33 Tammelo, supra note 3 at 247. This includes the comment by Julius Stone, Fictional 
Elements in Treaty Interpretation 1 Sydney L. Rev. 344, 347 (1953-54), that the ‘rules’ of 
treaty interpretation “too often do not compel the interpretation; . . . even when they 
appear to do so, some competing but equally authoritative canon might, if invoked, have 
yielded a different interpretation; . . . in any case identical interpretations can usually be 
reached without invoking any set of canons at all.” 
 Whereas Stone’s inclination is to hide indeterminacy lest judicial judgment lose 
its authority, Tammelo responds to such instinctive recoiling in the face of rhetorical 
imagery (a recoiling which I call ‘fluidity angst’) in the following frank terms: 
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rules of interpretation with the chimera of logic or stringent reasoning in 
mind rather than through frank acceptance that such principles are 
incapable of compelling results: 
 
Thus it is appropriate to think of the principles of treaty 
interpretation as well as the principles guiding the choice and 
the application of these principles as ‘places’ of rhetorical 
argument within which the interpreter can search and find 
what is requisite for the application of the law. . . . [O]ne 
[such sceptic] has been inclined to view the rules of treaty 
interpretation as roads to right legal solutions rather than as 
footholds for struggling for these solutions . . . .34 
 
These observations by Tammelo are borne out by a perusal of the 
judgments of the European Court and the way in which elements of the 
treaty interpretation principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (as well as the specific doctrines developed by the Court) have 
been either quite selectively or formulaically invoked. Having studied the 
Court’s entire output until 1999, I am confident that a detailed analysis of 
the Court’s case law would reveal numerous examples of the use by the 
Court of a doctrine or interpretive principle in a way which, when looked 
at in isolation, is inconsistent with the invocation of (or failure to invoke) 
that principle in another case.35 The principles of interpretation are only 
part of the rhetorical tool chest, and their invocation predictably enough 
                                                                                                                         
 Where does this process of constant challenge and justification finally come to a 
rest? In terms of rhetoric the answer is that it never finally does so. . . . If this seems 
disquieting it is only because it is forgotten that insights in a changeful human world can 
only rest assured, and can only remain ‘fresh’ and viable, through constant challenge and 
retesting. 
Ilmar Tammelo, Treaty Interpretation and Practical Reason: Towards a General Theory 
of Legal Interpretation (1967) 46 [hereinafter Tammelo, Treaty Interpretation]. 
34 Tammelo, Treaty Interpretation, id. at 249-50 (emphasis added). 
35 Such analysis could benefit from an exhaustive comparison of the arguments that were 
used before the Court, as published in Series B of the Court, with the arguments that find 
a place in the judgment itself. Series B volumes (which have now been discontinued) 
contain records of the written memorials of all parties, transcripts of the oral hearings and 
a copy of the Opinion of the European Commission on Human Rights. 
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reflects a high degree of selectivity – or ‘incoherence’, as some would put 
it. My own view is that, especially in this kind of area, interpretive 
principles have highly limited conceptual potential, notably because their 
invocation is itself largely a matter of choice.36 They are bound to be 
deployed as a function of a broader effort to persuade others (whomever 
they are deemed to be) of the justness and appropriateness of particular 
results.37 And we should expect no more in light of the Court’s own 
observation in the Golder case: 
                                                 
36 See Colin Warbrick, Coherence and the European Court of Human Rights: The 
Adjudicative Background to the Soering Case 11 Mich. J. Int’l L.1073 at 1078-80 (1990), 
discussing cases in which the Court has reached results “without paying much attention to 
any constraints in the Convention text” and which are “little more than rationalizations of 
preferred outcomes”. The tone of a kind of disillusionment is, in my view, misplaced, as 
judging in this context (with the breadth of rights language and interpretive principles, as 
well as the diversity of starting points of each judge) inevitably leads to ‘rationalizations’. 
With respect to such diversity of starting points, see J.G. Merrills, The development of 
international law by the European Court of Human Rights 226 (2d ed. 1993): 
 [I]t is more useful to see members of the Court as caught up within a field of 
ideological tensions with positions ranging from extreme activism to extreme restraint on 
one axis, and from tough conservatism to benevolent liberalism on the other. 
Furthermore, judgments should not simply be seen as a crude function of the complex 
relationship between a fixed matrix of each judge. This is because each judge, no less 
than the Court as a whole, moves about the matrix from case to case; judges are, put 
simply, human beings who are buffeted by ‘contradictory’ impulses and dispositional 
strains. 
 If the rationalizations that emerge out of such a moving matrix are unpersuasive, 
then it could be because the underlying reasons are unpalatable to the observer or because 
of the weddedness of the observer to a different range of topoi. Or, as I think is perhaps 
Warbrick’s main concern, the rationalization is unpersuasive because it is not argued for, 
but rather simply asserted. In this respect, the point I make in upcoming sections is that 
there are better and worse methodologies based on how frankly and clearly judgments 
reveal all the reasoning driving a judgment – and thus open themselves to critical scrutiny 
of the quality of the reasoning and the over-all persuasiveness of the conclusions. Of 
course, being convinced of this depends on accepting a starting-point of valuing 
frankness, openness, and comprehensiveness in reason-giving. 
37 Prott, supra note 3.  In the course of her analysis of the nature of judging in the 
international context, she notes (at 123) that, partly because public international law is 
less systematic and has more lacunae than domestic legal orders, “[t]he [International 
Court of Justice] judge can rely even less on purely formal reasoning within a closed 
system to justify his decision than can a judge in a national court”. Also, she observes (at 
123-24) that “[a] distinguishing attribute of non-systematic reasoning is the use of various 
  
22                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 01 
 
 
In the way in which it is presented in the ‘general rule’ in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention [on the Law of Treaties], 
the process of interpretation of a treaty is a unity, a single 
combined operation; this rule, closely integrated, places on 
the same footing the various elements enumerated in the four 
paragraphs of the Article.38 
 
B. THE STARTING POINT(S) OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF TREATIES 
 
As indicated in Golder, the generally accepted point of departure for any 
interpretation of a treaty is Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. Article 31(1) sets out the general (and generally 
accepted) rule for treaty interpretation: 
 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in light of its object and purpose.39 
 
Article 31(2) goes on to define the meaning of the word “context” in 
Article 31(1) in a limiting way so as to refer only to other textual 
provisions within the same treaty; “context” is thus meant to connote the 
                                                                                                                         
arguments of which no single one is convincing, but the cumulative effect of which is.” 
She quotes John Wisdom’s well-known metaphor of reasoning being more like 
constructing the legs of a chair than the links in a chain. Similarly, international 
judgments display a “complicated web of justification in which, in the best examples, the 
judge uses almost every tool which is available to him. . . . The structure of reasoning is 
like that of a building, not that of a chain” (at 128). 
 We should not think that this is somehow limited to the idiosyncrasies of the 
international judicial process. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the 
Constitution (1982) for an account of how six kinds of interpretive arguments (historical, 
ethical, doctrinal, prudential, textual, and structural) are interwoven into different patterns 
with the aim of producing the most persuasive argument in a given case. 
38 Golder v. United Kingdom, (1975) 1 E.H.R.R. 524, 532.  
39 Emphasis added. 
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familiar approach to legal interpretation, that is, reading one part of a text 
in light of the other parts and in light of the text as a whole.40 The 
subsequent subclauses of Article 31(3) flesh out this basic framework by 
reference, inter alia, to various kinds of conceptual and evidentiary 
reference points that may be drawn upon to understand the elements of the 
compendium ‘rule’ stated in Article 31(1): the relevance of separate 
agreements that evince the intention of the parties, of subsequent 
interpretive practice and of parallel norms of international law (notably, 
customary international law and general principles of international law, 
but also norms in other treaties to which the relevant parties – or a critical 
mass of the parties – are also bound) that can interpretively inform the 
content of treaty provisions. 
 
The relevance of the historical understanding of treaty drafters calls for 
special mention. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention envisages the use of 
such travaux only as a supplementary method after an Article 31 operation 
has first been carried out.41 That noted, Article 31(4) directly refers to the 
                                                 
40 Some have read Article 31 as a victory for the forces of semantic textualism over those 
of a wide-ranging contextual approach to interpretation. There is a measure of truth in 
this in that the particular contextualized version of treaty interpretation developed by the 
Yale School of International Law is almost certainly not endorsed by Article 31. 
However, even if Article 31(2) purports to limit the relevant context to that of the rest of 
the treaty text, there is ample reason to believe, judging from the actual practice of 
interpretation and basic philosophy of language, that no “ordinary meaning” can emerge 
without reference, implicit or explicit, to background or parallel social understandings 
that interact with the terms used in a legal document. What would seem to be rejected by 
the Vienna Convention approach is the New Haven view that context is nearly everything 
and that text is a mere point of orientation without any serious priority status in the sense 
of providing presumptive meaning (at least as the regulative ideal of argument) or 
filtering the force of other interpretive arguments. 
41 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention reads: 
 Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm 
the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning 
when the interpretation according to article 31: 
  (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
  (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  
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intentions of the treaty parties as an historical matter (“[a] special meaning 
shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended”). It 
is not immediately obvious whether “special” is meant to convey the sense 
of being different or non-ordinary or, rather, the sense of a specific or 
limited meaning in a situation in which the term in question is otherwise 
open to a wider range of referents and meaning, although the first sense is 
probably the main intended meaning.42 How such a special meaning is to 
be “established” is also not specified, but it would seem sensible to have 
recourse to appropriate forms of historical evidence on how a term was 
used either in social discourse, or in legal discourse at the time a treaty 
was concluded. Such evidence must surely include the use of the 
preparatory work of the treaty itself. If so, Article 31(4) constitutes an 
exception in that the travaux can legitimately serve as a primary source of 
interpretation as long as the purpose is the focused one of proving a 
contended-for special meaning as opposed to using the travaux as an 
undifferentiated part of the overall argument about the ordinary meaning 
of the treaty terms.43 
 
As noted earlier, the European Court of Human Rights took the view in 
the Golder case that the various elements stated in Article 31 are to be 
appreciated in terms of their interrelationship with each other and not as 
isolated elements each giving their own independent answer to the 
interpretive question at hand. In this way, we may think of each of the 
                                                                                                                         
The fact that the majority of the Court in Golder ignored the travaux in this case as being 
unnecessary, while in other cases of less controversy the Court has invoked the travaux 
shows nothing more than the obvious, that is, the mix of judicial dispositions of all the 
judges combined and the persuasiveness of arguments in light of those dispositions in the 
given case will dictate how principles of interpretation are deployed in the judgments, 
minority and majority. 
42 It is probably fruitless to keep these two senses distinct even if the Vienna Convention 
drafters can be shown to have meant one sense or the other. 
43 If one were concerned to prevent the Article 31(4) exception from swallowing the 
Article 32 rule on the use of the travaux, it might be thought that the scope of Article 
31(4) is limited to some extent by the use of the word “term” as opposed to a word like 
“provision” or “article”. However, this avenue seems not to be viable if it is considered 
that the basic rule of Article 31(1) juxtaposes “treaty” with the “terms of the treaty”. 
Thus, the word “term” appears capable of covering everything from a single word to a 
phrase or expression, a clause, or an entire article. 
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above-emphasized phrases within Article 31(1) as constituting a starting 
point or, put differently (in rhetorical-tradition fashion), a non-dispositive 
commonplace of argument.44 In the Article 31 process, no single element 
of interpretation has been granted a licence to act as a pure competitor to 
the distinct interpretations separately arrived at under the mantle of one of 
the other elements. Put differently, no single school of interpretation 
associated with one of the elements that has found mention somewhere 
within Article 31 – textualists, contextualists, teleologists, historicists – 
enjoys monological dominion. By this understanding of Article 31, the 
ability to put forward an interpretation based on any one school of 
interpretation is constrained by the requirement to have first entered into a 
dialogue with the other schools. In this way, interpretation is ultimately a 
holistic act of understanding that gathers together the combined 
perspectives brought to bear on the question by the different points of 
reference sanctified in Article 31. 
 
However, this does not mean that the various commonplaces of argument 
found in Articles 31 enter into the interpretive pot without some initial 
allocation of priority or hierarchy in presumptive weight. For example, 
arguments about the intention of the parties based on historical 
documentation have less weight than arguments based on an evolved 
understanding in light of changes in background international legal 
principles (general or customary) since the adoption of the treaty; as 
already mentioned, Article 32, read in light of Article 31(1), makes clear 
that recourse to historical intention as manifested in the travaux is a 
subsidiary means of interpreting a treaty. In putting the matter more 
affirmatively, Judge Matscher of the European Court of Human Rights has 
expressed a widely held view that all interpretations are bound to keep 
both the text and the purpose at the centre of an interpretive account: 
 
It is clear that the text of the treaty itself is given first priority 
and must be the starting point for any interpretation, and 
attention should be directed not so much to its semantics as to 
                                                 
44 On these rhetorical terms, see Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities, supra 
note 28 and Kratochwil, supra note 3. 
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the object and purpose of the treaty (teleological 
interpretation).45 
 
This principle of purposive-but-text-sensitive interpretation applies to 
treaty interpretation generally and not only to international human rights 
treaties. In this way, text and purpose might be thought of as the central 
pillars upon which the construction of an argumentative structure takes 
place, the governing assumption being that they are to bear an equal 
weight and are mutually supporting. An understanding of purpose is 
guided by the text, while an understanding of the text is guided by the 
purpose: this is the most basic structure of treaty interpretation. If this may 
be thought of as the engineer’s ideal design, it must also be acknowledged 
that architectural modifications and innovations are both necessary and 
desirable in the life of any home or community. That said, if it is proposed 
that one pillar should (or even must) bear more weight, then a departure 
from this balance needs to be carefully justified in terms of whether that 
pillar can sustain the proposed weight in light of all the other structural 
elements of the building. Have all the parties to a treaty participated in an 
interpretive amendment so as to make the text in question mean something 
entirely different, thereby replacing the original textual pillar with 
another? Is the historical intention so clear on the existence of a special 
meaning of a term that the textual pillar’s strength is weakened to the 
extent that it must be reconstructed using the more solid historical 
material? Is the text so clear that arguments based on the purpose of the 
document cannot be accepted even though that purpose is necessarily 
undermined to some extent by the text-faithful reading? Is the purpose so 
compelling that certain features of the text that seem to contradict that 
purpose can be modified or even ignored, or certain received doctrinal 
interpretations of those terms reinterpreted?  It can thus be seen that the 
extent to which the text or purpose may be displaced inter se or by other 
elements is a function of whether the overall structural form remains 
sound (the engineer’s primary concern) and both aesthetically and 
functionally pleasing (the architect’s primary concern).  
 
                                                 
45 Franz Matscher, Methods of Interpretation of the Convention, in The European System 
for the Protection of Human Rights 63 (Ronald St. John Macdonald, Franz Matscher, & 
Herbert Petzold eds., 1993).  
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If it is true to say that the Vienna Convention provides the starting points 
for interpretation, it must also be said that, for all their air of 
comprehensiveness, the provisions of the Vienna Convention do not 
exhaust the field of relevant interpretive touchstones. Other sources of 
argument may be called in aid such as case law (including doctrines 
concerning the weight to be attributed to precedents), treaty commentary 
and general doctrine written by academic commentators, interpretive 
guidelines issued by international agencies particularly concerned with the 
subject matter of the treaty in question, references to the overall goals of 
international legal order (or of a specific field, such as international human 
rights law, law of the sea, diplomatic immunity, and so on), and the 
resolutions of international organizations possessing varying degrees of 
normative pretension and force. These sources are in turn cocooned by 
broader forms of argument that self-consciously draw on relevant 
considerations that are not strictly legal, including appeals to fundamental 
social values, consideration of the social consequences of one 
interpretation over another, theories of the appropriate role of a particular 
institutional interpreter as compared to other institutions, and so on.46 As a 
matter of either the rules of evidence of tribunals, or of extra-tribunal 
practice, virtually no argument is formally barred by international law 
from playing a supporting role for other arguments of a more central 
character. These ‘external’ referents inevitably come into play given that 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention “gives no directions on the questions 
. . . of a static or historical as opposed to a dynamic or evolutive approach 
to interpretation, and of a narrow as opposed to a broad interpretation”.47 
 
Such questions condition what might be thought of as the overall 
interpretive orientation or guiding interpretive baseline for a particular 
treaty.  Here, it is worth noting parenthetically that the idea of a single 
baseline is of course a simplification that should instead be thought of as 
complex compendium of multiple baselines.  The characterization of the 
subject matter or field of the treaty (what Article 31(1) refers to as its 
“object”) will be especially instrumental in settling upon the appropriate 
interpretive orientation or baseline for the treaty as a whole or for a given 
                                                 
46 See Bobbitt, supra note 37, for standard forms of argument in US constitutional law. 
47 As put by a former judge of the European Court of Human Rights: Matscher, supra 
note 45 at 65-66. 
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part of the treaty. A bilateral boundary treaty and a multilateral aviation 
convention will be viewed in starkly different terms, and in turn these will 
be viewed as instruments which are very different from the United Nations 
Charter, and so on. All participants in treaty interpretation bring to bear 
implicit and explicit assumptions about the nature of the field in question. 
This is a feature of the interpretive enterprise that is relatively unremarked 
upon. Indeed, it is not uncommon to witness the expression “object and 
purpose” in Article 31(1) collapsed into and used interchangeably with 
“purpose”.48 However, from a linguistic point of view, the “object” of a 
treaty and its “purpose”, although closely related, are not the same. 
 
The object may be thought of as helping to provide a macro-context for 
the interpretive enterprise, including the way in which (and the detail with 
which) a treaty’s purpose should be characterized.49 Various treaty macro-
contexts may share common features which may tend to produce a core 
orientation for the interpretation of these treaties to the extent that the 
subject matter of these treaties shares relevant characteristics. For 
example, ship navigation and maritime traffic conventions may be thought 
to have significant commonalities with some aviation and air services 
agreements, or at least to share certain core elements.  Most significantly, 
these kinds of treaties would seem to be paradigms of treaties, the subject 
matter of which is perceived as having, virtually ready made, a reciprocity 
of interest that – contrary to international human rights treaties – requires 
the interpreter to track carefully the original and evolving intersubjective 
expectations of all of the states party to the treaty. Yet, an object of a 
treaty need not be whole or pure; for example, air and sea traffic 
conventions may incorporate elements that deal with environmental side-
effects in the commons (for example, the air and water of the high seas) or 
                                                 
48 See, for example, the Matscher quotation, supra text at note 45. 
49 Even this description of the object of a treaty retains formalist constraints, for it could 
be said that there are even wider “macro” contexts in which every interpretation is 
situated. For example, the classic “wider context” that seemed to work at virtually every 
level of Myres McDougal’s interpretations was that of the Cold War. For reasons too 
numerous and detailed to elaborate here, it is not desirable to conceptualize such 
variables as being structural features of legal interpretation as opposed to contingently 
present aspects of political reality and perspectival dispositions which legal interpretation 
necessarily takes into account in ways too unpredictable and variable to capture in any 
useful way the required aspects of legal interpretation itself. 
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shipboard safety conditions, and these elements may be thought to be less 
dependent on reciprocity of intention and more conducive to interpretation 
that independently seeks to promote the object in question. Thus, different 
treaty subject-matters or objects may usefully be examined in terms of the 
varying extent to which interstate reciprocity is the glue of the treaty either 
because of what may seem virtually inherent aspects of the object in itself 
(for example, a rules-of-the-road treaty such as an aviation treaty) or 
because state representatives clearly perceive reciprocity as an 
indispensable element of the treaty relationship. In particular, normative 
reciprocity and effectiveness are very often indissociable if a treaty regime 
provides either for no role, or for a very limited and sporadic role for 
authoritative third-party institutional actors to interpret treaty terms (either 
at the international level, or within the legal order of each state party) and 
thereby to play a partially constitutive role in defining the interests and 
expectations of states.50 Thus, the presence of institutional interpreters 
other than states will itself have a constitutive impact on the 
characterization of the nature of the subject matter. 
 
C. SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES 
 
It is hoped that the foregoing gives an adequate idea of the largely non-
hierarchical constellation of principles and premises that must or can be 
drawn upon in giving meaning to a treaty norm. It will now be helpful to 
make some schematic observations about the specific approaches to the 
sources of argument in human rights treaty interpretation that have 
developed over the past two decades.51 Perhaps the most fundamental 
principle, now widely accepted, is that the underlying object and the 
purpose of a human rights treaty – and of specific terms within any given 
                                                 
50 See, in particular, the example of nuclear arms non-proliferation treaties in the leading 
account of international treaty interpretation in terms of the role of horizontally structured 
interpretive communities. See Johnstone, supra note 3. 
51 It is recognized that this is itself an exercise in rhetoric, akin to the normative-
explanatory method Raz draws attention to in The Morality of Freedom, supra note 4. 
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treaty – shape textual analysis to an even greater extent than normal.52 
This is due not so much to the fact that either the object or the purpose has 
actually been assigned greater interpretive weight as an abstract matter, 
but to the special nature of the object (interests which are fundamental to 
individual spiritual and material well-being and which are also 
instrumentally valuable to securing various communal goods such as 
pluralistic democracy, a climate of civic tolerance, and a non-arbitrary 
legal system) and purpose (the protection and promotion of human rights) 
of a human rights treaty. 
 
In this regard, the glue of interstate reciprocity loses much of its 
conceptual relevance because the primary treaty relationship is generally 
imagined much less in terms of the horizontal relationship(s) among states 
(and the concomitant expectations of state officials) and far more in terms 
of the treaty’s role in constituting a legal relationship between each state 
party and those individuals and groups subject to that state’s jurisdiction.53 
As classically phrased by a former judge of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and member of the UN Human Rights Committee who is 
now a judge of the International Court of Justuce: 
 
                                                 
52 Thomas Buergenthal, Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court, 79 Am. J. Int’l L.  
1 (1985) Michael Boyle, David J Harris & Colin Warbrick, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 5-29 (1995) Olivier Jacot-Guillarmod, Les principes 
d’interprétation, in La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme” commentaire 
article par article 41 (Louis-Edmond Pettiti, Emmanuel Decaux, & Pierre-Henri Imbert 
eds., 1995).  
53 That is not to say that this represents all of its relevance: see René Provost, 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2002). That being said, in human 
rights treaties, it seems most accurate to say that reciprocity metamorphoses into a 
question of fair treatment of each state party by any third-party institutional actor charged 
with interpreting a treaty. Reciprocity will continue to function as a motivational factor 
and a factor conducing to compliance when states perceive their interest to lie in 
promoting the protection of human rights in other states, for example if they see this as 
giving support to a way of life they wish to promote domestically because they believe 
such promotion has instrumental effects on matters such as international peace and 
security or because they have significant numbers of nationals who they wish to see 
treated well abroad (for instance migrant workers). However, interstate material 
reciprocity will almost never structure state obligations in the pervasive ways it does 
relative to other kinds of treaties. The best examples of this are in the areas of 
applicability to foreign nationals, of countermeasures and of reservations.  
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[A human rights treaty is] a multilateral instrument or 
framework enabling States to make binding unilateral 
commitments not to violate the human rights of individuals 
within their jurisdiction.54 
 
Perhaps the most authoritative statement of principle remains that of the 
European Court of Human Rights, which remarked in Ireland v. The 
United Kingdom that the interstate context of the litigation did nothing to 
change the non-reciprocal basis of each state’s commitments under the 
European Convention on Human Rights: 
 
Unlike international treaties of the classical kind, the 
Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal 
engagements between Contracting States. It creates over and 
above a network of mutual bilateral undertakings, objective 
obligations which in the words of the preamble benefit from a 
'collective enforcement'.55 
 
A number of related propositions feed from and into the interpretive 
orientation just described. All of the following propositions are phrased as 
a matter of degree given that no hard-and-fast statements can hope to 
capture all the interpretive practice that has rapidly grown up around 
dozens of regional and universal human rights treaties in recent years. In 
particular, no attempt is made to probe the extent to which international 
tribunals, in the course of practical decision-making, sometimes invoke 
certain interpretive principles formulaically or selectively in ways that 
suggest that what really matters is doing justice on the facts of the case 
(always of course with an eye to how the precedent will look in the future) 
– as they appear to a group of jurists after receiving argument from the 
state and non-state parties and after good-faith deliberation among 
themselves. 
 
The first related proposition is that the travaux are generally, although not 
invariably, treated by tribunals as being even less significant than the 
                                                 
54 Buergenthal, supra note 52 at 19 
55 Ireland v. United Kingdom, judgment of 15 January 1978 (Series A no. 25, p. 90, S 
239). 
  
32                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 01 
 
travaux are for non-human rights treaties. The reason for this is precisely 
because the reciprocity dimension is far less important (as, accordingly, 
are the specific historically bound intentions of states) and because the 
purposive dimension (itself partly generated by the general historical 
intent to protect human rights) is far more significant. The practice is that 
international human rights tribunals make use of the preparatory work 
“only on comparatively rare occasions”.56 This does not mean that the 
travaux should not be referred to at all, especially if the negotiating record 
helps clarify the nature and strength of a particular human rights concern. 
It is fair to say, however, that the travaux are relied on infrequently and 
unpredictably in order to enhance and make more persuasive 
interpretations already arrived at based on text and purpose and 
comparatively rarely to justify an interpretation that goes against 
purposive reasoning.57 
 
By way of a second proposition, the notion of purposive interpretation has 
often been associated, as a matter of general international treaty 
interpretation, with a principle of effectiveness according to which one 
role of interpretation is to make effective what the parties bargained for 
rather than settling on a meaning that would render ineffective, in whole or 
in part, the treaty or provision.58 This principle of effectiveness plays an 
                                                 
56 Matscher, supra note 45.  See also Merrills, supra note 36. 
57 A good example is the refusal by the European Court and Commission of Human 
Rights to read a right to divorce into Article 12 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which guarantees the “right to marry”, primarily on the basis that the travaux 
reveal that all states (most notably those, like Ireland, with legal prohibitions on divorce) 
at the time of drafting understood that such a right was specifically excluded. See 
Johnston v Ireland, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Ser. A, No. 112 
(1986). The Court drew some sustenance from the fact that the final clause in the text of 
Article 12 also seems to mandate, or at least justify, a higher level of deference to 
domestic legal systems with respect to the specific subject matter of marriage. Article 12 
reads: “Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this rights.” See the 
further discussion of Johnston in Part 6, infra. 
58 See e.g. D.P O’Connell, International Law for Students 108 (1971): “The parties are 
deemed to have intended a result that can be effectively brought about….Lauterpacht 
drew from his analysis of the practice of the International Court the proposition that the 
intention of the parties must be interpreted even to the extent of disregarding the letter of 
the instrument, and of reading into it something which, on the face of it, it does not 
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even more pronounced role with respect to international human rights 
treaties as expressed in the not-infrequent reminder by the European Court 
of Human Rights to interpret human rights provisions so as to render them 
not “theoretical or illusory but . . . practical and effective”.59 It is important 
to note, however, that international human rights tribunals have been 
careful to affirm that the actual words used in a text, reflecting as they do 
careful choice by the drafters, must still play a constraining role with 
respect to how far purpose can produce broad or generous interpretations; 
in other words, creative and expansive readings of general language 
should not cross over into distorted readings, recognizing as always that 
one judge’s illegitimate distortion may be another judge’s legitimate and 
even necessary creative reading.60 
 
Thirdly, the focus on purpose also tends to generate a principle of 
interpretation according to which interpretations of the definitional scope 
of rights that favour the protection of the values and interests underlying 
legal rights (and, in this sense, are favourable to the individual) are to be 
preferred over alternative interpretations that are less protective.61 A 
corollary is that textual exclusions from the definition of a right, as well as 
limitations on rights, once defined, are to be interpreted restrictively.62 
This is not to deny that the interpretive terrain is still significantly open-
textured, not only for identifying interests worthy of protection, but also 
                                                                                                                         
contain, so long as that ‘something’ is not ‘contradicted by available and permissible 
evidence of the intention of the parties.’  When there is an implicit collision between the 
principle that the intention of the parties is to prevail and the principle of treaty 
effectiveness, the Court, in [Lauterpacht’s] opinion [adopted by O’Connell], will give 
emphasis to the latter.” 
59 Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Artico v. Italy, judgment of 13 May 
1980, Series A no. 37. 
60 Merrills, supra note 36 at 90. A related point is that the judicial gloss placed upon texts 
through the jurisprudence constante of case law does generate its own form of textual 
resistance by creating presumptions against otherwise viable interpretations. While 
international human rights tribunals do not follow a doctrine of strict binding precedent 
(unknown to international law, in general), for better or worse they do approximate such 
a system. 
61 Buergenthal, supra note 52. 
62 Matscher, supra note 45. 
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for identifying and applying considerations relevant to limitation.  Such 
open-texturedness is especially the case in situations of rights-related 
polycentricity – direct conflicts between the concrete rights-protected 
interest(s) of one person and the concrete rights-protected interest(s) of 
another. Rather, the claim is more that the principle of restrictive 
interpretation (of limitations on rights) applies to a fuller extent when the 
concrete rights of specific other persons are not at stake and others’ rights 
are diffused within a collective good to the extent that we speak of the 
rights of society or of the community facing those of the individual as 
opposed to either concrete social sectors or groups or specific individuals. 
Yet, even then, it would be inaccurate not to recognize that, at the 
international level no less than in domestic constitutional orders, the 
various kinds of justifications of limitations on rights (rationality, 
necessity, proportionality) are applied with varying degrees of stringency 
– as a function, inter alia, of the general importance of the rights at issue, 
perceptions of the legitimacy and competence of the tribunal to make its 
own judgments in the field of activity in question, the seriousness of the 
impact on the person whose rights are affected in the specific case at hand, 
and the pressing nature of countervailing considerations.  
 
The fourth proposition is that the legal practice of interpreting human 
rights is uniquely situated at the crossroads of the social, political, moral 
and economic discourses with which it constantly interacts.63 As such, 
interpretations may evolve as understandings of human rights (in general 
or in particular) change and thus as the guiding purpose (again, in general 
or in particular) changes. Such a principle of evolutive or organic 
interpretation has not only been frankly acknowledged by international 
tribunals, but it has also been welcomed as healthy and necessary to 
prevent stasis, ossification and ultimately irrelevance.64 The evolution of 
                                                 
63 This does not exhaust the spectrum. 
64 See especially Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgement of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, 
pp. 15-16, para. 31, and the invocation by the European Court of Human Rights of the 
notion of a “living instrument.”  And see the reiteration of this notion much more 
recently, in 1995, in the following terms in Loizidou, infra note 120 para. 71 “That the 
Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions is firmly rooted in the Court's case-law (see, inter alia, the Tyrer judgment…). 
Such an approach, in the Court's view, is not confined to the substantive provisions of the 
Convention, but also applies to those provisions, such as Articles 25 and 46, which 
govern the operation of the Convention's enforcement machinery. It follows that these 
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social, political, moral, and economic understandings and values can, of 
course, include the good, the bad, and the ambiguous. Not surprisingly, the 
sense of evolution in interpretation endorsed in international jurisprudence 
is that of progressive evolution – that is to say, changing interpretations 
should benefit human rights protection rather than cut back on it. In this 
way, human rights treaty protection acts, in principle, as a ratchet. Once a 
certain interest or societal group has been recognized as worthy of 
protection in terms of human rights, stepping back from past levels of 
protection in the name of interpretive evolution is presumptively 
regressive and, as such, unjustified. 
 
Of course, as many questions are begged by the above formulation of the 
fourth proposition as are answered by it. It does not and cannot on its own 
provide a basis for determining when (or even whether) new life has to be 
breathed into a right, that is, whether or when evolutions in values and 
understandings parallel to the treaty order are ripe to be incorporated into 
that order. More significantly, this formulation is apt to be taken as a naïve 
suggestion that progress with respect to rights protection is a 
straightforward quantitative question of cumulatively greater protection of 
the underlying interest: the more protection, the better. In fact, there is a 
pervasive qualitative dimension in that what may look to be regressive in 
one dimension (less protection for one interest) is actually progressive in 
another (more protection for other interests). In particular, evolutions in 
understandings bring with them a constant reappreciation of how the rights 
of different persons (or groups) should interact in terms of relative priority 
and in terms of a necessary mutual accommodation. As such, the 
maximization of human rights cannot be the kernel of the idea of progress; 
rather, the governing injunction must be that of the optimization of human 
rights.65 Only a few examples need to be given to illustrate the point. 
Defence rights of accused persons that have included the right to dredge 
up the sexual history of a rape victim may come into conflict with new 
understandings of gender equality. Parents’ rights to have their children 
educated in terms of their philosophical or religious convictions may yield 
                                                                                                                         
provisions cannot be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of their authors 
as expressed more than forty years ago.” 
65 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 331-40 (1993), on the idea of trade-offs among 
rights and the goal of the optimal as opposed to the maximal protection of all rights. 
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with time to greater recognition of children as rights-holders whose 
choices and (state-protected) best interests must now be given more 
weight than they have been given in the past. The right of landlords to 
some degree of property protection must be reevaluated in the face of 
social policies designed to assist disadvantaged tenant groups, especially 
when there is a parallel recognition of the right to adequate housing as a 
core human right. The right to freedom of expression may interact with 
equality in ways not fully appreciated in the past in regard to matters such 
as pornography and hate literature, while limitations on pornography may 
have to be re-evaluated when the perspectives of traditionally excluded 
sexual minorities are integrated with gender-oppression analysis and some 
feminist theories.  What becomes apparent from the foregoing example[S] 
is that the idea of progressive evolution is a regulative ideal, but not one 
which tells us on its own whether a rights-protected interest should receive 
more or less extensive protection. Yet, that said, if the ideal of progress 
cannot hitch its wagon to any essential truth with respect to the current 
level of protection of a right, it must surely have the effect of requiring a 
government putting forward an argument that would cut back on that level 
of protection to bear the burden of making an affirmative case as to why 
the new interpretation is desirable, perhaps even necessary, for progress. 
In such an exercise, the more directly the government can connect the 
lessening of protection of one right to an evolving (or newly understood) 
necessity to protect another right either of identifiable persons, or of an 
identifiable social group, the more likely that the case can be made out that 
it is necessary to accord the right less protection than the right has been 
accorded in the past. Similarly, the more remote the connection to the 
recognized rights of others (or, put differently, the more the rights of 
others become indistinguishable from arguments about the good of society 
as a whole), the more exacting must be the scrutiny as to whether it is 
indeed justifiable to lower the protection. 
 
D. CHRONIC VAGUENESS, DISAGREEMENT AND HUMAN AGENCY 
 
There is an additional formal quality of fundamental human rights 
interpretation generated by a constitutive feature of the field (i.e. the object 
of treaty interpretation): human rights tend to remain chronically vague 
concepts even after centuries of case law.  Such vagueness is not just – 
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indeed, not primarily – a function of the generality of their phrasing but 
also a function of the received meanings accorded to textualized rights 
being forever ‘vulnerable’ to evolving understandings of both their own 
contours and their relationship to the “conflicting considerations” spoken 
of by Raz.   This semantic vulnerability is magnified in institutional 
contexts lacking a system of formally binding precedent or in which the 
convention of according respect to a jurisprudence constante includes 
relatively lenient criteria for departing from precedent. 
 
In light of this governing feature of the field, some would say that at 
minimum what is needed – and what can (must) be provided by the law – 
are parameters for argument (the premises to which Raz refers), most 
notably in the form of principles and even detailed rules of interpretation. 
In this way, it is hoped that unwieldy rights can be disciplined and perhaps 
even rendered “coherent.”66 But the search for well-established canons of 
interpretation of treaties that would provide legal shape to an international 
human rights trbunal’s interpretive endeavours is surely a chimeric one.  
As we have seen, principles and premises of interpretation play at most a 
channelling role in relation to specific interpretive contexts and associated 
audiences.  While some interpretations can be excluded from the range of 
interpretations viewed as having a claim to reasonableness by a given 
interpreter in relation to his or her interpretive community, no 
uncontrovertible, determinative result is possible simply by virtue of the 
‘correct’ employment of these principles and premises. 
 
Thus, it is not surprising that Tammelo suggests that the real guides and 
boundaries of interpretation can only ultimately be provided by higher 
level topoi rather than by those topoi represented by interpretive principles 
(or those represented by rights themselves).  He fastens on those of “good 
faith, reasonableness and prudence.” Crucially, Tammelo links the role of 
these values (I would call them ethical dispositions or human virtues) to 
the necessity for the institutionalization of rhetorical argumentation as 
opposed to placing any faith on them as free-standing normative 
constraints on interpretation: 
 
                                                 
66 Recall Warbrick, supra note 36 at 1073, who focuses on the lack of “coherence” of 
Court decisions in terms which I am inclined to speak of as problems of 
“persuasiveness”. 
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The best remedy that legal experience has provided [for the 
openness and fluidity of interpretive arguments and outcomes] 
is the establishment of institutions by legal orders which have 
the ultimate authority to lay down what in a particular case a 
vague term or ill-defined concept is to mean. The necessity of 
these institutions is suggested by the very nature of practical 
reason, which can operate only through human agents capable 
of insight, of discernment, and of making up their minds. 
Hence it may be said that the judicial function in legal orders 
is of paramount importance. And this is why the debility of 
this function in the international legal order is one of the main 
weaknesses of international law.67 
 
So, not surprisingly, we arrive – expressing Tammelo in other terms – at 
the view that, in the end, situated human beings and their faculties of 
judgment form the major constraint in interpretation. Yet, is “constraint” 
the right word? Tammelo really goes no further than to endorse a 
decisional positivism – the necessity for there to be “authorit[ies]” to “lay 
down . . . mean[ings].” Short of taking refuge in some essentialistic faith 
in shared insight amounting to discovery of truth, a Tammelian call for the 
institutionalization of rhetoric is, in and of itself, but a classical call for 
order and finality through legal process. It does not go the next step and 
ask hard questions about the normative legitimacy, beyond an assumed 
legal validity, of given institutional arrangements for producing 
authoritative interpretations.  
 
Can any observer of legal rights adjudication in the 1990s read passages 
such as those just quoted without almost immediately asking questions 
like: Whose good faith, reasonableness and prudence? Whose insight and 
discernment? Who has the power to persuade and who do they imagine 
they must persuade? To answer “human agents” is to embrace a naivety 
wholly out of keeping with the realism represented by the understanding 
that in a world of rhetorical reasoning there can be no certainty or 
necessary justice. Thus it is that a rhetorical approach to human rights 
                                                 
67 Tammelo supra note 3 at 251-52. For an excellent discussion of how parties to a treaty 
can constitute a context of good faith and reasonableness through the interpretive 
community formed by intersubjectively arriving at shared meanings, even without third-
party dispute settlement organs, see Johnstone, supra note 3. 
2008] DIVERSE PERSUASION(S) 39 
 
 
 
interpretation has a special need to link that understanding to the problems 
of institutional representation and the associated responsibility of those 
who are charged with authoritative interpretive roles. To these questions 
we now turn. 
 
IV. THE ONGOING PEDIGREE OF STATE SURROGACY: 
LAUTERPACHT AT THE HALF-CENTURY ON 
REPRESENTATION AND AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS COURT 
Having arrived at a place where Tammelo points to the need to discipline 
the fluidity of rhetoric with the positivization of interpretive authority, I 
turn to an almost-forgotten classic in international human rights 
scholarship.  A discussion of the attention paid by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht 
in his mid-century work International Law and Human Rights to the nexus 
between international authority and state representation is useful for 
understanding how the problem to be overcome is still substantially 
unmodified 50 years later in conventional thinking.68 Writing in 1950, 
Lauterpacht’s specific focus was on an international human rights court at 
a time when it was still hoped that the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights would be followed by an international treaty overseen by such a 
court. As it would of course turn out, something quite different evolved 
with the adoption in 1966 of the two Covenants, the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR. For several decades, then, it was only in Western Europe that a 
court was written into a human rights treaty, namely, the European Court 
of Human Rights.69 
 
 
                                                 
68 H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (Archon Books ed., 1968). 
69 The American Convention on Human Rights later created another regional court, the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights. 
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A. LAUTERPACHT ON JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND (INTER)STATE 
REPRESENTATION 
 
Lauterpacht starts by taking state sovereignty as a baseline premise. As 
such, he notes, as a corollary, that the “the jurisdiction of [a proposed 
International Court of Human Rights] to review . . . acts of the highest 
organs of the State will constitute a pronounced degree of surrender of 
national sovereignty.” 70 In attending to the problems of the legitimacy and 
general authority of such a court in an order organized with state 
sovereignty as the dominant normative baseline, he turns, inter alia, to the 
question of how representation on such a court could help attenuate the 
problem of the authority of court judgments. 
  
Before looking at his compositional scheme, however, we must first note 
the form of judgment that Lauterpacht is assuming would issue from any 
court.71 Lauterpacht is assuming that court decisions would be both final 
and binding on any states subject to a negative judgment. That being said, 
it is significant that he did limit the remedial scope of the binding court 
judgments. Under his scheme, remedies were to be limited to declarations 
of incompatibility and, when appropriate, decrees of monetary 
compensation. These limited remedies were contrasted by Lauterpacht to 
others that he rejected as nonviable, notably, according the International 
Human Rights Court the remedial “power of formal nullification of acts of 
the highest judicial or legislative organs of the State.”72 Lauterpacht’s 
rationale was the need to “soften” the “impact of the innovation [of 
international court review] . . . without detracting from its reality and 
effectiveness.”73  He felt this would be achieved by making judgments 
binding but of limited remedial scope. 
                                                 
70 Lauterpacht, supra note 68 at 383-84. 
71 The connection between representation and form of judgment will be touched on in 
Part 6. 
72 Lauterpacht, supra note 68 at 384. 
73 Id. at 384.  Interestingly, faced with the binding power of its own judgment under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights has 
restrictively interpreted Article 50 of the European Convention to limit its own remedial 
role in exactly the way that Lauterpacht proposed; see Craig Scott, Multinational 
Enterprises and Emergent Jurisprudence on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
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Now that we have noted the formal powers Lauterpacht was assuming his 
proposed International Human Rights Court would have, we now return to 
the question of representation.  Lauterpacht’s proposed court was to have a 
permanent nucleus of 11 judges, to whose ranks he proposed would be 
added, for each case, three additional members, who would be judges and 
nationals of the impleaded state. He conceived of this case-by-case 
expansion of the Court from 11 to 14 members as a device that would 
“render it, in a sense, an enlarged Court of Appeal of the State.”74 Put 
differently, the presence of national representatives would, in this way, 
enhance the dimensions of self-judgment (by a state) involved in a court 
decision. We might think of an embedded metaphor of the Court crossing 
a frontier from outside (the state) to inside (the state) by being transformed 
metaphorically – “in a sense” – into a national court. 
 
It is instructive, however, to record exactly how Lauterpacht 
conceptualized a philosophy of state representation as speaking to (while 
not fully resolving) the problem of authority. His reasoning remains 
relevant to the general problem of the authority of judgments 
(international or not) vis-à-vis those to whom the judgments are addressed. 
Lauterpacht reasoned first of all that the participation of national judges 
would help alleviate the sense of judgments being imposed by foreigners, 
especially judgments decided by narrow majority votes (for example, 6-5) 
of the permanent 11 judges: 
 
These persons [that is, the national judges] would have the 
power of decision and voting on the same footing as the 
permanent members of the Court. Their participation would 
not decisively affect the character and continuity of the Court. 
On the other hand, it would ensure that decisions vitally 
affecting the constitution and the sovereignty of the State 
                                                                                                                         
Rights, in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 563, 576-77 (Asbjorn Eide, 
Catarina. Krause, & Allan Rosas eds., 2d ed. 2001), for a discussion of the Court’s 
continuing refusal (in Guerra v. Italy, judgment of 19 February 1998, European Court of 
Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, No. 64) to develop a 
declaratory remedial jurisdiction, let alone an injunctive one. See Part 6, infra, for a brief 
discussion of the negative effects of the paradigm of binding legal judgment. 
74 Lauterpacht, id. at 384. 
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concerned are not given by a small majority of foreign 
judges.75 
 
Lauterpacht goes on to elaborate how the authority of the judgment 
(within the impleaded state) – by which he means its persuasive authority 
– would vary in proportion to the representation of the national judges in 
the majority decision. On this view, apart from positive legal authority (the 
formal bindingness of a judgment), a more general authority (perhaps 
better termed its “legitimacy”)76 is viewed as relative to the degree of 
(surrogate) representation of the state-society in the judgment or, put the 
other way around, the extent to which the judgment can be viewed as 
having been produced through an exercise of self-judgment: 
 
[A] judgment given against the State by a decision concurred 
in by all the judges who are nationals of that State would be 
fully acceptable to its public opinion, for it would indicate that 
there has taken place an obvious violation of the [proposed 
International] Bill of Rights. If all the nationals of that State 
were to vote in favour of upholding the measures taken by it, 
an adverse decision would be made correspondingly difficult, 
while an unfavourable decision given by a majority including 
one or more nationals of that State would not be open to the 
objection that it is a judgment of a purely foreign tribunal and 
would to that extent be more acceptable to public opinion.77 
 
Of considerable interest in the immediately preceding passage is the fact 
that Lauterpacht is oblique in addressing the situation in which all three 
national judges vote for finding no violation. He says only that “an adverse 
decision would be made correspondingly difficult.” This could be a purely 
empirical statement of likelihood in the sense that a super-majority of the 
remaining non-national judges would be required in order to achieve an 
                                                 
75 Id.  at 385 
76 In the sense understood by Franck; see Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy 
among Nations (1990). At 19, Franck defines legitimacy as “the perception of those 
addressed by a rule or a rule-making institution that the rule or institution has come into 
being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.” 
77 Lauterpacht, supra note 68 at 385 
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overall majority (that is, with all three national judges voting in favour of 
the impleaded state’s position, 8 of 11 would be needed in order to 
produce a majority, namely 8-6, with 7 only being enough to produce a tie 
vote of 7-7).  Lauterpacht may be making more than an empirical 
observation,however. He would seem to be attributing enhanced 
normative force to a representational scheme that requires a very large 
non-national vote in order to prevail over a unified national vote for a 
contrary result; recall that in the first of the above quotations, his goal 
seems to be the avoidance of negative rulings “given by a small majority 
of foreign judges.”78 Viewed in this way, the scheme is designed to make 
sure that the permanent court of 11 judges must vote by at least 8-3 in 
order to decide a case against a state in the face of all of that state’s 
national judges preferring to find in favour of the state. Lauterpacht may, 
inchoately, have been getting at an aspect of procedural fairness in the 
sense of Thomas Franck’s “right process.”79 One can analogize to the 
traditional notion of the right to a fair hearing. The premise appears to be 
that a state (or, state-society) is likely to view a judgment as possessing 
enough legitimacy to be obeyed if the process of judgment is such that 
members of the state government (or members of the state-society as a 
whole) can feel content that their view of the matter has been heard and 
taken seriously in the intracourt deliberations, even if that view had not 
been convincing enough to bring more than a few non-national judges on 
board. 
 So, on Lauterpacht’s conception, a court, in ruling without any 
national judges joining the majority, would still be ruling as a “purely 
foreign tribunal,” but will have done so having been well apprised of all 
the factors speaking in favour of upholding the law or government 
(in)action. We get some sense of this when Lauterpacht comments (albeit 
as a separate thought and not one directly tied to the issue of the 
foreignness of the judgment): 
 
 Moreover, some such modification of the composition of the Court 
in individual cases would go a long way towards meeting the 
objection that a foreign tribunal, not conversant with the laws and 
traditions of the State, is called upon to pronounce on matters 
                                                 
78 Id. (emphasis added). 
79 Franck, supra note 76 at 19. 
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touching the very core of national life and of national 
sovereignty.80 
 
In Lauterpacht’s reasoning, “international” is synonymous with “foreign” 
in situations where there are no national judges involved in the 
international decision-making process. It is the inclusion of national 
judges that produces some kind of transformation of the “foreign”.  This 
transformation can perhaps be understood in some metaphorical fashion as 
the nationalizing of the foreign (whether this results from the participation 
of the national judges in the majority decision – thick nationalization – or 
merely from the participation of these judges in the deliberations of the 
court as a whole – thin nationalization). This is only one part of the 
explanation of how the Court is de-foreignized through Lauterpacht’s 
proposed procedure of enhanced national representation, however. 
Another (the other?) part is the inter-nationalizing of the foreign. I employ 
the hyphenated formulation “inter-national” here in order to emphasize the 
element of intersubjective horizontality that is achieved (or, at least, aimed 
at) by the enhanced representation formula proposed by Lauterpacht. The 
judgment loses the ‘international as extra-national’ quality that would 
result in the equation of “international” with “foreign” and assumes (some 
degree of) an ‘international as inter-national’ quality. In this way, the 
international human rights treaty that is the subject of interpretation can be 
viewed as site of continually negotiated normativity in the space between 
self-judgment and other-judgment. The treaty is neither national nor 
international – that is, it is a shared inter-national space – and it is both 
national and international – that is, both the national and extra-national 
elements are still identifiable, even if they merge to some extent in what 
John Rawls has called an overlapping consensus.81 Indeed, Lauterpacht 
                                                 
80 Lauterpacht, supra note 68 at 385 (emphasis added).  This is of course the main public 
justification for the current requirement that a national judge sit on each case brought 
against a given state under the European Convention. 
81 For the initial invocation of the notion of an "overlapping consensus" capable of being 
affirmed by opposing philosophical doctrines, see John Rawls, The Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus 7 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 1 (1987).   The notion is easily extendible 
to the process of reaching agreement in a multiple-member court whereby national and 
foreign judges, seeking to pen collectively a majority judgment, come to agree on shared 
language (usually at sufficiently intermediate levels of abstraction to secure consensus), 
even if they individually diverge on the deeper reasons that justify this formulation. The 
idea of an overlapping consensus can also shed some light on the situation in which 
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ends his discussion of enhanced representation with a recognition of the 
hybridity of legal orders implied by his representational scheme: “There 
may also be some wider significance in an attempt, implied in the proposal 
here put forward, at a combination of – and the raising of the rigid barrier 
between – national and international jurisdiction.”82 
 
 
V. DIVERSITY OF KNOWLEDGE, COMMUNICATION 
AND TRANSNATIONAL  INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
Were an international human rights court again to be on the agenda some 
60 years after Lauterpacht’s creative exercise in institutional design, 
would we be well advised to continue to perceive, with Lauterpacht, that 
the key is to find ways to build the national into the extra-national so that 
binding international judgment can be sufficiently justified as an 
acceptable incursion into sovereign juridical space?  In this part, I give a 
qualified ‘no’ in answer to this question by arguing that there are more 
relevant axes of representation for enhancing the persuasive authority of 
an international human rights institution than radically incomplete 
schemes for conjuring some creative non-fiction that an irreducibly non-
national judgment is actually national in its crucial aspect. In the 
concluding part, Part 6, I return, however, to the still-lingering problem of 
the international as external in order to suggest that this problem should be 
approached in ways other than through – or, at least, in addition to – the 
representational composition of representation within international human 
rights bodies. 
 
The main purpose of this part, then, is to elaborate the theoretical 
justifications for promoting “interactive diversity of knowledge.”  This 
notion was initially presented, in somewhat summary fashion, in another 
work called “Bodies of Knowledge” for which the context is set by recent 
recommendations that a consolidation of the six UN human rights treaty 
                                                                                                                         
foreign judges are sensitive to the use of reasoning in the majority judgment that attends 
to concerns voiced by the national judges who still dissent from the result.  
82 Lauterpacht, supra note 68 at 385. 
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bodies into one or two bodies should be on the UN reform agenda.83 My 
argument was that a harnessing of diversity must be central to any 
consolidation reforms and that diversity-enhancing initiatives must be 
undertaken immediately with respect to the current six-committee order, in 
part because practical experimentation with the promotion of diversity will 
provide valuable lessons at the institutional design stages of any eventual 
consolidation project. But the central thrust of the argument is that such an 
approach is independently desirable quite apart from whether treaty-body 
consolidation is in the cards. Two premises are central. The first is that 
superior collective judgment is exercised when multiple perspectives are 
encouraged to interact with each other in coming to grips with any given 
normative issue or decision. The second premise is that, in order for 
diverse perspectives and actors to interact, there must first be a 
commitment to ensuring diversity within the composition of the 
membership of collective decision-making bodies. Diversity multiplies 
perspectives, while the need for decision-making necessitates that these 
perspectives engage each other. Diversity helps oust monological 
reasoning in favour of dialogical reasoning, making it less likely that 
reasoning will take place within the four corners of a single person’s 
limited knowledge and more likely that it will take place in the context of 
the requirement to test one’s assumptions and intuitions against those of 
others. The operative good of a “dialogical universalism” is knowledge 
and the perspectives that adhere to knowledge. In somewhat 
oversimplified terms, we can think of “social experience” and 
“disciplinary expertise” as the two main forms of knowledge relevant to 
the juridical construction of normative knowledge.84 
 
                                                 
83 Craig Scott, Bodies of Knowledge: A Diversity Promotion Role for the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, in The Future of UN Human Rights Monitoring 403 
(Philip Alston & James Crawford, eds., 2000). 
84 Scott, id. Section B: “Valuing Diversity of Knowledge”, 406-11. It is important to 
acknowledge that expertise and experience are overlapping forms of knowledge. This 
point will not be developed in the present chapter beyond the note that informal 
experience can be said to generate a type of expertise, while formal expertise is often 
incomplete or underdeveloped if it lacks experience of the world or of the issues being 
studied. For development of a third form of knowledge mentioned in Bodies of 
Knowledge, that of normative focus, see Scott, supra note 31 at 8-9 
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In the present part, there is be a shift in relative emphasis. As noted, 
Bodies of Knowledge focused mostly on how interactive diversity is more 
likely to produce results which are qualitatively superior to those produced 
by more monological processes of decision-making. As such, the emphasis 
there is mostly on the positive instrumental contribution of 
representational diversity to substantive performance, and, as such, to both 
the specific authority of each interpretive result and the overall authority 
of a given juridical institution. The discussion in the present section 
merges this substantive virtue with a more process-oriented account of 
general institutional authority. This account seeks to explain how 
interactive diversity places an institution in a better position to claim 
(democratic) legitimacy for the judgments it produces.85 Part of the 
argument is that attention must be paid not only to the dialogical authority 
of the institutional collective, but also to the dialogical ethos of each 
individual member of that collective. 
 
A. COMMUNICATIVE LEGITIMACY, VERTICALIZATION OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DECISION AND REPRESENTATIVE SURROGACY 
 
Support for the principle of the interactive diversity of knowledge can be 
found in what might seem to some an unlikely source within mainstream 
international legal scholarship, namely, the long-standing theoretical work 
pioneered by Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell at Yale with their 
several collaborators. McDougal and Lasswell advocated thinking of law 
as a process of communication in which an instrumental orientation 
towards the pursuit of common interest(s) coincides with a requirement 
that decision-making institutions incorporate a range of perspectives. They 
developed a highly regimented and complex methodology which included 
principles designed to enhance the capacity of any given decision-maker 
to take into account the perspectives of all persons and communities 
affected by a contemplated decision, with the objective of thereby 
                                                 
85 Here, it is important to note that “democratic” is used in a general normative sense to 
signal the ideal of the effective involvement of those affected by decisions in the 
governing arrangements that produce those decisions and is not an endorsement of any 
specific form of political democracy as a necessary precondition for a state-society’s right 
to be part of the international human rights treaty order. 
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achieving a kind of perspective of perspectives.86 Elements of a 
philosophy of strong diversity can be discerned in their theory – at least, in 
its implications while certainly not always in the specific articulations or 
real-world applications of it by its founders. According to this philosophy, 
communication across markers of difference is necessary in order to 
approximate the regulative ideal of the perspective of humankind as a 
whole. On this approach, legitimacy is directly tied to as wide as possible 
a – ideally a universal – sharing of power. The key premise is that the 
participation of affected persons and groups enhances both the political 
legitimacy and the substantive quality of the prescriptions that emerge 
from any given decision.87 With the reader’s indulgence, a collage of 
extracts is cut and pasted below in order to convey how diversity fits 
within the line of reasoning advocated by the New Haven approach: 
 
 The overriding policy is that of universality: all who are affected 
by, or who can affect, authoritative decisions should, or should be 
made to, participate in the making of such decisions. . . . The wide 
sharing of power requires both pluralism and equality. All 
individuals and groups who are affected by decisions should be 
represented in such decisions, both functionally and territorially. . . 
                                                 
86 See, in particular, Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell & Lung-Chu Chen, Human 
Rights and World Public Order 367-368, 372 (1980): 
 The deliberately policy-oriented, configurative approach we recommend for 
inquiry about human rights problems, as for all legal problems, begins with the 
unequivocal establishment of an observational standpoint in identification with the whole 
of humankind and with the explicit postulation of a comprehensive set of preferences, 
formulated at a necessarily high level of abstraction, about the shaping and sharing of all 
human dignity values. . . . The prescriber or applier or other evaluator of policy options 
has an obligation to make himself as conscious as possible of the full range of 
communities, from global to local, of which he is a member and upon which his choices 
will have unavoidable impact. 
87 Alongside political legitimacy and substantive quality (qua functional performance) as 
elements of persuasive authority, there is also a strategic dimension which interacts with 
the other two, namely, effectiveness. On effective strategy as a reason for choosing 
dialogue as a method in human rights interpretation, in addition to questions of political, 
as well as cultural legitimacy, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward a Cross-Cultural 
Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im ed., 1992).  
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The constituent perspectives appropriate to a public order of 
human dignity should be directed toward the clarification and 
protection of common interests (significantly affecting all) and the 
rejection of claims of special interests (destructive of common 
interests). . . . The identifications of established decision-makers, 
as of community members, should be encouraged to extend to the 
larger community of humankind and all its component 
communities. For the better clarification and integration of the 
common interest, an appropriate balance should be sought for 
decision-makers in terms of culture, class, group membership, and 
personality. . . . Established decision-makers, again like 
community members, should explicitly examine their expectations, 
or matter-of-fact assumptions, about the conditions under which 
demanded values can be secured. The most realistic orientation 
requires unceasing effort to improve structures and procedures for 
inquiry and communication.88 
 
From this composite passage, we can see that the idea of diversity and 
universality going hand in hand is central to the New Haven idea of 
(international) law as a process of authoritative decision-making. The 
bridge between the two is provided by communication – by interactive 
diversity. It is only by starting from real-world differences in perspective 
                                                 
88 McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 86, at 400-02 (emphasis added). While this is 
not the occasion to engage in subtextual analysis of the authors’ use of the concept of 
“special interests”, I do wish to make clear that McDougal, Lasswell & Chen and I do not 
always share the same conceptions in relation to the concepts they employ. For example, 
the following passage possibly shares some space with prevailing conservative 
conceptions which deny the relevance of diversity of social experience to law: 
“Participation in decision should be upon the basis of equality in interest, without 
discrimination irrelevant to merit and contribution and without minorities being 
authorized to make policies for the whole”, id. at 401. This passage is to be read in light 
of the authors’ earlier observation of the tendency for humans to “refer to ourselves and 
others with labels (such as race, color) having no rational relation to basic humanity or to 
potential contributions to the common interest”, id. at 46. The basic thrust of their claim 
about the irrelevance of ‘race’ is undeniable to the extent that it is understood as a denial 
of particularistic essentialism and of any socially constructed claims of superiority based 
on markers such as race or colour, but the added claim that such labels are irrelevant as 
“potential contributions to the common interest” can all too easily be read as denying the 
relevance of social groups’ concrete historical and social experience of racialization to 
our general understanding the common interest. 
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and in community membership, partly by paying attention to the 
composition of institutional decision-makers and partly by engaging in 
critical self-examination of one’s assumptions, that communication as 
dialogical engagement can take place. 
 
In many respects, the McDougal and Lasswell approach to (international) 
law has paralleled and even presaged contemporary theoretical writings 
that centre on what is variously called communicative ethics, discourse 
ethics, and dialogical ethics.89 According to such an ethics, legal norms are 
legitimate to the extent that they have been or can be treated as if they are 
generated intersubjectively through pluralistic communicative 
engagement. Jürgen Habermas, for example, arrives at an ideal “discourse 
principle” not dissimilar in formula to the “overriding policy of 
universality” posited by McDougal, Lasswell and Chen in the above-
quoted passage. According to this principle, “the only regulations and 
ways of acting that can claim legitimacy are those to which all who are 
possibly affected could assent as participants in rational discourses”.90 
This principle then serves as a premise for the claim that the ideal 
institutional form of such participatory legitimacy is for “citizens [to] test 
which rights they should mutually accord one another”.91 
 
Such citizen-to-citizen engagement is of course a regulative ideal, not a 
sociological possibility, in the decision-making contexts of most modern 
polities.92 By signalling from the outset the counterfactual nature of the 
ideal (“could assent”), the Habermasian discourse principle builds in 
                                                 
89 For an especially-useful anthology, see The Communicative Ethics Controversy (Seyla 
Benhabib & Fred Dallmyr eds., 1993). 
90 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy 458 (1996). The initial articulations of Habermas on the discourse 
principle started at around the same time as McDougal and Lasswell were beginning their 
collaborations. 
91 Id.. 
92 Of course, even if it were viable, such engagement could still only be a co-ideal when 
other considerations are brought into play, such as the need for sufficiently efficient, 
stable and timely regulation of common life and the need for human beings to balance 
their status and responsibilities as political beings with the other spheres of human 
endeavour and fulfilment that pull them in many directions at once. 
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recognition of the basic problem that the ideal of participatory democracy 
is not an institutionally viable form of law-making (including law-
interpreting) outside very small communities, and, even then, it is 
probably only applicable in its purest sense to certain kinds of normative 
problems. As such, the citizen-citizen (or, as I prefer, person-person) 
public discourse that Habermas uses as the benchmark for ideal legitimacy 
must be translated into an analysis of how well different forms of 
institutionalization of decision-making embody this ideal. The result is 
that we move of necessity from a focus on direct participation to a focus 
on indirect participation through representation. 
 
The ideal of horizontal (interpersonal and intrasocietal) discourse thus 
does not disappear in the move to vertical institutionalization. Rather, it 
insinuates itself as a structural problem for the design of the institution 
both in terms of composition and procedures. How can an institution 
organize itself and then present itself as a legitimate substitute for pure 
participation? The answer must take at least two forms. Firstly, the 
discourse principle must be transformed into a more concrete principle 
according to which the institution must seek to function to the extent that 
is practically feasible as a surrogate or microcosm of the relevant 
community of persons. It must aim for, while of course never achieving, 
the replication of the interpersonal participatory dialogues that are the 
posited democratic ideal. One consequence of such a surrogacy principle 
is that the composition of the body must be such that dialogue within the 
institution simulates, as it were, these (ideal) dialogues within society at 
large; this is the concern about representivity and diversity. Secondly, the 
institution must not be thought of as a self-contained microcosm in which 
the members only have to engage in a dialogue internal to the institution. 
However much persuasive moral authority can be generated by implicit or 
explicit appeals both to the representativeness of the institution and to the 
dialogical process within the institution that precedes a given decision, the 
ideal of incorporating the perspectives of all affected persons and groups 
as a surrogate for actual participation can only be approached, not reached, 
within the confines of any given institution. This being so, we are always 
constrained to work with degrees of approximation of ideal interactive 
diversity in society. It therefore in some sense follows that, in addition to 
representative dialogue internal to the institution, the institution as a 
collectivity must also be imagined as a participant in ongoing dialogues 
with the society and polity at large. This externally oriented participation 
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may take many concrete forms. It can involve dialogues with other 
institutions which have normative mandates covering the same or related 
areas.93 It can also involve stimulation of wider social debate (for instance, 
via the general news media or in professional publications) to which the 
institution can then listen and respond. 
 
B. BREAKING BAD HABITUS 
 
As a condition for the legitimacy of judgment not only do others need to 
be represented in deliberations, but also those representatives cannot share 
so much of what a leading European sociologist has termed habitus that 
they are scarcely challenged to imagine how normative issues might look 
if approached from outside the confines of their existing knowledge 
framework.94 To fully appreciate this, we need actively to cultivate a 
healthy sense of how we take much for granted that, once queried by those 
with different perspectives, seems to be less firmly grounded than our 
earlier complacence would justify. 
 
My own experience working in the field of social and economic rights for 
a number of years and attempting to relate that doctrinal field to the 
realities of a life lived in poverty has convinced me of how very difficult it 
is fully to understand even with the best faith and considerable effort that 
                                                 
93 For example: courts interacting with legislatures or with administrative agencies; 
international human rights institutions interacting with states, with specialized agencies, 
with regional human rights bodies, or with the non-governmental sector; human rights 
committees interacting inter se; and so on. 
94 To modify a colloquialism, such a deliberative practice would, in its most extreme 
form, amount to mutual preaching by the converted to the converted. Pierre Bourdieu’s 
idea of habitus can be paraphrased as a reference to the constellation of dispositions, 
baseline assumptions and world views that are embodied in a group of persons, such 
habitus being structured, inter alia, by a person’s present location in social hierarchies, as 
well as by formative influences such as social group experience and educational 
upbringing (notably professional elite formation). While I believe that we can speak 
meaningfully of each person having her or his own unique habitus, the primary sense of 
habitus is of a shared phenomenon, “[t]he conditionings associated with a particular class 
of conditions of existence” that operate at some subconscious level on the behaviour of 
those imbued with such habitus; they are “structured structures predisposed to function as 
structuring structures”. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice 53 (1990). 
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which is not one’s own experience or area of expertise. I am constantly 
amazed at the layers of meaning I fail to grasp that get drawn to my 
attention when I hear those living in poverty recount the nature of the 
harms and indignities they experience and, more importantly, perceptively 
analyse the complex interaction of social forces and official behaviour that 
contributes to these experiences and that creates barriers to extrication. 
That being said, it is also significant that I find myself equally amazed by 
how well some people who work on a regular basis on behalf of and with 
poor people can understand the experience of poverty even when they are 
themselves economically well off. These foregoing observations are 
deliberately intended to be unsystematic. The only point I wish to convey 
is that, even if we are comparatively privileged (on one or more 
dimensions), most of us should be able to appreciate the difference 
diversity can make by recalling our own periodic self-awareness about the 
limits of our own perspectives and by appreciating the value of the 
contribution that diverse perspectives have made to our own understanding 
in certain contexts. By working with such meta-experience (experience of 
our own insufficient experience), we can encourage ourselves to approach 
normative issues by seeking to understand the kinds of perspectives that 
will help broaden horizons and, as such, help prevent a given institutional 
decision-making context from succumbing to conceptual gridlock.95 
                                                 
95 I could multiply my own anecdotes. Another influential ‘meta-experience’ for me was 
my role as coordinating instructor for six years of a short course called “Race and 
Cultural Difference”. It was a mandatory, one-week intensive course for all first-year law 
students that was one component of an overall course called “Perspectives on Law”. A 
central objective of the course was to introduce students to issues surrounding racism and 
ethnocentrism in legal systems and in legal philosophy. As a Caucasian male of Anglo-
Saxon heritage, my own direct experience of being at the receiving end of these 
phenomena in Canada, either in society at large or at the hands of the legal system, is 
essentially non-existent. Despite working on this course for all these years and despite my 
pedagogical policy of bringing in outside community speakers and other university 
teachers more able to relate experience to both theory and legal practice, I remained 
painfully aware of the limits of my own understanding. The lesson I have drawn: one 
learns, but one does not fully learn; one can intensify one’s learning, marshalling all 
one’s time and energy in so doing, and one would still only learn so much. 
 In Canada, for example, judges are increasingly acknowledging the importance 
of the inclusion of diverse perspectives, albeit sometimes only in terms which speak to 
what they will bring to a court that others cannot. It is a short step from realizing the 
value of one’s own distinct perspective to welcoming the inclusion of others’ 
perspectives with which one can interact. For example, Justice Gérard La Forest resigned 
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from the Supreme Court of Canada in 1997. He is a white male francophone who is a 
bilingual member of the minority French-speaking Acadian community in the province of 
New Brunswick, which is one of the four provinces on Canada’s Atlantic coast. He is 
also a former law professor who was considered the leading (indeed, the only) 
international law specialist on the Court. In Canada, there is a non-binding convention 
that the Prime Minister will appoint judges to the Supreme Court based on a certain 
geographical distribution (three judges from Québec and three from Ontario, one judge 
from British Columbia, one judge from the three Western Prairie provinces combined, 
and one judge from the four Eastern Atlantic Provinces combined). Prior to Prime 
Minister Chrétien’s appointment of La Forest’s replacement, much discussion centred on 
the various demographic criteria the Prime Minister should consider in choosing this one 
person. It was generally assumed that the replacement would also come from the Atlantic 
Provinces, and it was also assumed that a judge from one of the three provinces other 
than New Brunswick would get the nod. As there are only two women on the Court 
(down from a high of three at one point), many argued that gender was a highly salient 
criterion. Others focused on professional skills. 
 In the result, the Prime Minister appointed another white male francophone from 
New Brunswick, Mr. Justice Michel Bastarache. Intraregional diversity and gender 
diversity appear to have given way to an emphasis on diversity of juridical expertise and 
the continuing worth of including a member of a minority French-language community. 
In terms of the Court’s expertise gaps, one should recall that La Forest was the Court’s 
only international lawyer and that Bastarache has a graduate degree in international law. 
As well, Bastarache has served as a legal academic, indeed (like La Forest) a dean of law 
at one of Canada’s law schools. This form of legal expertise was singled out by La 
Forest’s daughter, herself Dean of Law at the University of New Brunswick, when 
interviewed on her father’s replacement: 
 [I]n the end, the issue that really counts is one of quality, not geography or 
gender. These people [Supreme Court judges] are making extremely important decisions. 
The court needed an academic to replace my father. As an academic, you develop 
different skills; a reflective balancing of the issues [is] involved. 
Quoted by Kirk Makin, Top Court Choice Humbles Prophets: N. B. Francophone 
Replacing Same, The Globe and Mail, October 2, 1997 at A1. To be noted is that Dean 
La Forest’s comments about quality were related to the juridical needs – the expertise 
needs – of the court and made no claim that Judge Bastarache was purely and simply the 
best jurist (in some overall sense) in the pool. 
 Interestingly, in a few short sentences, Justice Bastarache himself encapsulated 
what he can bring to the Court in terms not just of expertise but of diversity of experience 
and expertise combined: 
 Asked to name the chief strength he brings to the court, Judge Bastarache cited 
his varied legal background. ‘It brings in a kind of experience of life that is different from 
others who are practitioners all their lives,’ he said. 
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Part of the rationale for an institutional strategy of opening up normative 
vistas by embracing an interactive diversity of knowledge lies in self-
conscious awareness of the (human?) tendency to link ‘truth’ and ‘self-
evidence’ in untenable ways. It is probably safe to say that most of us who 
actively take part in international human rights discourse are striving to 
articulate something morally fundamental in the course of our 
involvement; indeed, many of us would feel lost without such an 
orientation to the enterprise in which we are engaged., That does not mean 
that we must necessarily believe that concepts in texts like “freedom of 
expression” or even “torture” correspond to some ‘objective’ moral reality 
waiting to be discovered in the moral firmament, however. Even if some – 
or many – of us do firmly believe that some correspondence (or, perhaps 
more subtly, idea of correspondence) between language and the revelation 
of something called moral reality is a meaningful or even necessary way 
of thinking, such belief is still compatible with an awareness that what we 
may speak of or argue about in terms of objectivity or universal validity or 
truth is never knowable other than in terms of what we (whoever ‘we’ are) 
understand to be objective or universal or true at a given point in time.96 
Our access to meaning is mediated by language, and language is a 
phenomenon constructed on the shifting ground of intersubjective 
understanding. Thus, whatever quest(s) for truth may be immanent in our 
various involvements in the international human rights project, meaning 
                                                                                                                         
 ‘I am also a francophone, but not from Québec. That also brings a different 
perspective. I think it is important for the court to have the point of view of the sort of 
person who is impacted by their interpretation of these [minority] rights. I don’t think 
somebody of the majority-language group can understand how in daily life they are 
impacted by their decisions.’ 
Makin, id. at A4 (emphasis added). 
96 We can never ‘know’ in any final way whether an understanding we have reached 
intersubjectively is valid in any sense beyond the intersubjective. So, whatever we do to 
reduce subjectivity by enhancing intersubjectivity, we must still adhere to a certain ethic 
of communitarianism that compels us to defer to the judgments of authoritative 
institutions even when we perceive given decisions as wrong. It is fidelity to the good-
faith process of reaching for the moral insight embedded in the notion of human rights, 
not fidelity to each and every product of that process, that is the claim legitimate 
authority makes on us. That being said, there are limits to this fidelity. The more an 
official decision-making process is perceived as inadequately intersubjective, the more 
likely defections from respect for specific decisions will become. 
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remains quintessentially human – fallible in its relationship to that 
(ultimate) truth we seek. Thus, each of us has good reason to be humble 
about our knowledge. Indeed, we have good reason to be positively 
suspicious of our own understandings to the extent that they have been 
produced unreflectively or outside conditions of dialogical diversity.97 
 
Therefore, the quality of the intersubjectivity(ies) in which understandings 
are located must be a point of critical focus in assessing institutional 
judgments. Specifically, each of us should want to make sure each of our 
judgments are thoroughly tested by as wide and diverse a range of people 
as is practically feasible. In terms of the external addressees of an 
institutional decision, the outsiders faced with the judgment have an 
important reason to be confident in the rectitude of the decision if they can 
see that a group of people with diverse knowledge backgrounds have come 
to a consensus or achieved a large majority. This does not necessarily 
mean either agreeing with the result or being persuaded by the substantive 
reasoning of a given judgment. It means only that, within the 
representational imperatives of the institution, there is reason to accord the 
institution some general authority. By representational imperatives, I mean 
the indices that are (that is, that appear to us to be) most salient in order to 
achieve the fullest grasp of the issues at stake according to the normative 
focus of that institution. So, for example, one might feel that it is 
unjustified that an institution be composed entirely of persons trained in 
law, perhaps because one feels that lawyers, as a generally privileged 
group, are disabled from fully appreciating the social meanings generated 
by less powerful social groups.  If that same institution were nonetheless 
diverse in one or more other relevant dimensions, such as gender or 
cultural background, however, a general authority for the decisional 
product of that institution would be generated in some kind of direct 
relation to the effective incorporation of that element of diversity in the 
institution’s deliberations. The assumption that a more (effectively) 
inclusive process enhances the quality of deliberation and thus makes 
some difference to substantive outcomes allows us to be more respectful 
                                                 
97 Thus, ideas such as “epistemological humility” and “hermeneutics of suspicion” have 
had considerable currency in writing on interpretation over recent decades. These ideas 
express the warning that we must be on our guard against the effects privileged social 
location might have on our powers of social criticism and on our reception of the 
arguments of others. 
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of decisions which affect us, but with which we disagree, as compared to 
our possible reaction to decisions produced by a more sectarian group of 
decision-makers.98 If that institution (composed, for example, of 18 
individuals as are four of the six UN human human rights treaty bodies) 
came to include more people with professional backgrounds or personal 
career paths other than law, then the general authority that one should be 
willing to accord the institution would increase even if we can never be 
certain that any given outcome would have been different if the institution 
had been less diverse. Authority here is generated not simply by the 
possibility, or even probability, that the inclusion of diverse perspectives 
has led to an outcome which would have been different if that diversity 
had not been in place. Rather, it is generated by the sense of assurance that 
a common or significant majority position could not have easily evolved 
through indifference to difference. 
 
What angles of vision will be most salient will depend on the field in 
question.99 For example, the value of a certain form of geographic 
diversity in the international human rights context is illustrated by an 
observation made by Rosalyn Higgins in recollecting her years on the 
Human Rights Committee.100 She gives the example of how some 
Committee members from countries in the South took strong issue with 
European members on the question of whether the fair trial provisions in 
Article 14 of the ICCPR should extend to include administrative 
proceedings. The European Court of Human Rights had begun to expand 
                                                 
98 See Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights 13 Oxford J. 
Legal Stud. 18 (1993): “[D]ebate has a point: to use collective interaction as a way of 
reaching towards complicated truth. Simple truths, self-evident truths . . . form in single 
minds”. 
99 “Angles of vision” is Jennifer Nedelsky’s phrase: “The more angles of vision we are 
capable of taking into account in our judgment, the more we can free ourselves of the 
limitations of our private conditions. When we are locked into one perspective, whether 
through fear, anger, ignorance, or even through our notions of virtues such as duty, 
courage, or responsibility, we are not judging freely.” Jennifer Nedelsky, Judgment, 
Diversity and Relational Autonomy, J. A. Corry Lecture, Queen’s University, October 
1995 (unpublished manuscript) [Note to SSRN readers: An updated citation will likely be 
substituted here.] 
100 Rosalyn Higgins, Opinion, Ten Years on the UN Human Rights Committee: Some 
Thoughts upon Parting, 6 Eur. Hum.Rts L. Rev. 570 (1996). 
  
58                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 01 
 
the scope of the equivalent article (Article 6) in the European Convention, 
resulting in a convoluted and unsatisfactory jurisprudence, and decidedly 
negative reactions from a number of European states. This European 
experience was no doubt a consideration motivating some of the European 
members of the Committee to “urge[] that it would be utterly unreasonable 
to impose such a burden upon developing countries”.101 Yet, as Higgins 
goes on to note, many Committee members from developing countries 
took exception in the deliberations to this position of the European 
members, “urging us to realize that it was in the area of administrative law 
that so much abuse took place in their countries”.102 
 
Perspective does matter, and an important perspective is not always the 
perspective that one would expect to hear if one were called upon to speak 
for others instead of allowing others to speak for themselves. Higgins’ 
revealing anecdote goes a long way towards explaining why we should 
care about diversity generally, not simply some measure of geographical 
diversity. Had the Human Rights Committee been composed solely of 
members from European countries, there would have been a decreased 
likelihood that viewpoints grounded in the lived reality of developing 
countries would be taken into account. The same relationship must exist 
between the degree of inclusion of other indices of experience (and the 
associated knowledge) and the quality of collective deliberation. 
 
All that being said, it remains important here not to essentialize what it 
means to be from a developing country – or to have a particular gender or 
sexual orientation, or to have been raised in poverty, or to be dark-skinned 
in a majority light-skinned society.103 The claim is only that there is a 
decreased likelihood of relevant perspectives being taken into account if 
                                                 
101 Id. at 575. 
102 Higgins is not explicit about the result of the perspective of the members from 
countries of the South having been taken into account, but the case she was referring to as 
Landry resulted in the question being left open of the Application of ICCPR Article 14 to 
administrative proceedings involving social rights. See Y. L. v. Canada, Communication 
No. 112/1981, HRLJ 281(1986); see also the discussion of this case in Craig Scott, The 
Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of 
the International Covenants on Human Rights 27 Osgoode Hall L. J. 769,864-68 (1989). 
103 See subsection 5.d., infra, for further discussion of the essentialization objection. 
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we exclude persons with certain backgrounds. It is of course the case that 
each of us achieves access to knowledge outside our dominant social 
experience or professional formation in many ways other than engaging 
persons ‘representing’ that area of knowledge in face-to-face dialogue. 
Quite apart from the myriad forms of exposure of a given person to lives 
outside her or his own immediate experience, one of the functions of legal 
procedures is to provide means for other knowledge to be introduced into 
evidence, legal argument and judicial deliberation.104 Yet, even in a 
modern world of increasingly cosmopolitan education and more 
widespread global communications, we would be mistaken to be 
complacent with knowledge that is not meaningfully direct either in terms 
of experience or sustained study. Drawing again on the Higgins anecdote, 
one could easily assume that a number of the Committee members from 
European countries would claim with some justification to possess 
knowledge about conditions in certain developing countries. But the 
different perspective of at least some of the members from such countries 
suggests just how dangerous it is to rely on ephemeral or indirect 
knowledge and how easy it is to allow extrapolation from one’s own 
experience to dominate one’s thinking. 
 
C. THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER IN A DIVERSE INSTITUTION: 
RHETORICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
I wish now to advance several claims about the institutionalization of the 
principle of ideal participatory democracy. As already discussed, one 
claim is that a special kind of intra-institutional dialogue is required, and 
another is that the dialogue must be framed by a diversity of perspectives 
and thus be as ‘representative’ as feasible, in the sense of being, in 
                                                 
104 A number of the practices of the committees serve this function, such as: the 
acceptance and use of information provided by NGOs at various stages of the 
committees’ work, including in the form of alternative reports; the solicitation of 
information from specialized agencies of the UN; allowing NGO representatives to make 
oral presentations to a committee at the start of the committee’s session (a practice 
initiated by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); NGO input into 
committee working groups which are preparing questions to be addressed to 
governments, and involvement of experts from outside the committees in discussions on 
general normative themes or on draft general comments. 
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significant measure, a surrogate discourse for ideal society-wide 
dialogues. Another claim still, which I seek to develop somewhat in the 
present section, is that the persuasion of the self is an existential 
orientation that, if understood and approached in a certain way, is 
compatible with, and even facilitative of, dialogue with others. Diversity 
within the institution enriches the interior dialogue that any given person 
can hope to engage in. When diversity-based dialogue occurs among the 
members of the institution in parallel to a given person’s internal 
dialogues, that person’s dialogical imagination is stimulated in ways that 
are not possible if reflection occurs in a context where those interacting 
with the person are from very similar social backgrounds and training. The 
imagination requires contact with real others, and this is at least as much 
the case when the focus is on the persuasion of self as it is when the focus 
is on the persuasion of others. Seyla Benhabib has put it well: 
 
 Enlarged thought, which morally obligates us to think from the 
perspective of everyone else, politically requires the creation of 
institutions and practices whereby the voices and the perspectives 
of others, often unknown to us, can become expressed in their own 
right. A major mistake of Kantian moral theory is to assume that 
the principles of enlarged thought can be realized via the isolated 
thought experiments of a thinker. These solitary thought 
experiments often substitute the standpoint of the one privileged 
part for that of the whole. . . . The cultivation of one’s moral 
imagination flourishes in such a culture in which the self-centred 
perspective of the individual is constantly challenged by the 
multiplicity and diversity of perspectives that constitute public 
life.105 
 
In her reference to “principles of enlarged thought”, Benhabib indicates 
that mere diversity of perspective and of membership is insufficient. Also 
required are certain ethical dispositions and associated modes of 
reflection. 
 
                                                 
105 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics 140-41(1992). 
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In this regard, one further claim I would like to advance – which I will not 
fully justify here – is that a member of a representative institution must 
fully assume a rhetorical responsibility in relation to the substantive 
decisions reached. In the sense of the now-standard Habermasian 
formulation of the discourse principle introduced earlier, institutional 
legitimacy requires as full as possible an incorporation of the starting ideal 
that all those affected by a decision could assent if (counterfactually) they 
had participated in reaching the decision. This entails that the institution 
must, in some fashion, seek to persuade all those to whom its decisions are 
addressed that those decisions are justified (whether correct in a strong 
sense or at least reasonable in a context in which a standard of 
reasonableness is all that can or should be expected of a given institutional 
decision-maker). This duty to persuade is what I refer to as a rhetorical 
responsibility. 
 
It is obvious that this is a fearsome responsibility. The multiple audiences 
of many institutions can only be imagined and never directly, let alone 
simultaneously, addressed except in the most general way. This is 
especially the case for the normative judgments of bodies, such as the UN 
human rights committees, that are meant to have a global scope. If each 
committee member must (ideally) ask whether she or he has signed onto 
or individually penned reasons that could be seen as valid by all those 
affected by the decision, each normative act by any one of the human 
rights committees would have to take into account every person in the 
world in every context and every intermediate social group or association 
affected in one way or another by its interpretative acts. Involving (as it 
must) some kind of positing of either the generic reasonable person, or a 
universal audience towards which persuasive efforts must be directed, this 
prescription is so purely counterfactual as to be an unhelpfully fictional 
exercise. What all of this seems to suggest is that the measure of the 
authority of the institution’s external engagement with society at large 
cannot require some unattainable duty to persuade the world, but instead 
requires the adoption of more pragmatic or operational orientations with 
respect to how the institution and its members can take the duty to 
persuade seriously without being debilitated by it. In my view, it is both 
desirable and useful to forge an appreciation of the need for a certain 
orientation to argument as well as for a set of dispositions and a storehouse 
of methods that relieve the judge or committee member of the superhuman 
burden of having to persuade an elusive universal audience while still 
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imposing upon the judge an obligation to strive to persuade herself that her 
argument should persuade those who are the most affected by a 
decision.106 My use of the modal term “should” acknowledges that there is 
a gap between the Habermasian formulation in communicative ethics (that 
a norm or decision must be such that it can be followed by all the affected 
or relevant others in the sense of being a decision that they could assent to) 
and the real world of legal decision-making: a judge lives with the 
knowledge that the ideal of persuasion through legal judgment always, in 
practice, must come to terms with a residual coercive aspect vis-à-vis 
those who cannot or will not accept some of the key values and premises 
in the judgment. 
 
In relation to the Herculean aspirations of the New Haven project, I have 
argued in the past that we must consider a significant degree of 
impressionistic choice to be an endemic feature of interpretation in value-
laden areas that require normative outcomes to have universal validity.107 
To this observation, I would now add that we cannot and should not avoid 
acknowledging the huge element of decisional existentialism involved in 
acting as a human rights jurist at the international level. In varying 
degrees, any given normative act (a “judgment” of the European Court of 
Human Rights, or a “view” of the Human Rights Committee, or a 
“concluding observation” of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) is inevitably a projection of the identity of the persons 
participating in that normative act onto the world, a projection of their 
                                                 
106 With two further assumptions being made: (a) those other persons are assumed to have 
a general good-faith commitment to the idea of human rights (whatever their 
interpretations of that idea might be) and (b) those other persons are assumed to have put 
themselves in the institutional decision-maker’s shoes in terms of forming a view of the 
appropriateness of alternative interpretive conduct within that institutional role.  These 
two assumptions quite obviously need further development than can be provided at 
present. 
107 Scott, supra note 102 at 828-29: “Th[e] observational and interpretative standpoint 
[recommended by McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, supra note 86] would try to 
approximate some kind of objective view from nowhere by means of a view from 
everywhere. Laudable as this may seem, one may be forgiven for wondering whether it is 
humanly possible, or merely an unrealistic Herculean approach to interpretation. I do not 
believe that we can avoid taking incomplete and somewhat impressionistic stabs at 
viewing human rights questions from the perspective of those upon whom the impact of 
choices is most immediately and intensely felt.” 
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ideas of law, justice, human rights and so on. If we situate persuasion in 
the context of the ever-present potential for an imperial projection of self, 
persuasion cannot simply be understood as something one does vis-à-vis 
others. Persuasion must also include a self-directed process in which the 
judge or committee member justifies to herself the choices she has made 
and the ultimate choice to send her conclusions forth into the world in a 
way that is intended to change that world.108 
 
I am suggesting that a self-consciously existential turn towards judging 
oneself as judge usefully aligns the question of whether one can face the 
judgment of others with the question of whether those others should be 
persuaded. By directing attention to such an existential dimension of 
judgment, I am not thereby suggesting that persuasion is now to be 
conceived as solely a one-way phenomenon, but rather that it is also useful 
to perceive it as implicating self as opposed to implicating solely an 
imagined reasonable person or universal audience. Judging as persuasion-
of-self helps actualize other-oriented dialogue to the extent that it 
introduces a strong self-consciousness about our own situatedness. It 
invites us to know more about the person we already know best, but 
encourages us to look to others (and others’ knowledge and perspectives) 
precisely in order to discover the limitations of our own situatedness and 
to begin to see what we did not see before.  
 
A further assumption being made in advocating attention to the existential 
dimension of judging is that none of us are unitary beings. We are all 
dialogically constituted in that we have multiple experiences that influence 
us, multiple communities to which we feel some attachment, and multiple 
philosophies and ideologies that debate each other for our allegiance 
(variously contradicting each other and complementing each other). In a 
stronger sense, we may say that others inhabit us in that our identity is 
partly constituted and reconstituted by those others who have been and are 
significant in our lives.109 The extent of dialogicality varies, of course, 
                                                 
108 And which may change that world in unintended and even uncontemplated ways. 
109 See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Multiculturalism and the Politics 
of Recognition: An Essay 25, esp. 32-34 (1992); Edward E. Sampson, Celebrating the 
Other: A Dialogic Account of Human Nature (1993); James W. Wertsch, Voices of the 
Mind: A Sociocultural Approach to Mediated Action (1991). 
  
64                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 01 
 
depending on a person’s life history and depending on the extent pluralism 
infused the contexts that have helped mould the character.  
 
This argument neither assumes rampant dialogicality as an empirical 
matter, nor perceives dialogicality as an unqualified good unto itself. I am 
claiming only that a modicum of dialogicality is a basic feature of 
existence – indeed, a basic human capacity – and that one measure of the 
ethical potential of dialogicality is the extent to which it provides a 
psychic tool chest that assists us in becoming aware of those strains of our 
identity that too often can align themselves with dominant forces or groups 
in society.110 In other words, awareness of our own dialogicality is like a 
switch that shines a spotlight on our monological tendencies, which in turn 
makes it more likely that we can engage in the most primordial 
requirement of dialogue that combines success and legitimacy: the explicit 
examination of our own expectations and starting assumptions. 
Approaching judging as a persuasion of self thus asks the judge or 
committee member to render herself dialogical – to become as many as 
possible of the salient others to whom one must listen in order to persuade. 
 
D. REPRESENTIVITY AND INDIVIDUALITY 
 
Some might wish to object that the entire project of composing institutions 
so as to optimize the interactive diversity of knowledge necessarily knocks 
up against a problematic underlying assumption that a given individual is a 
general representative of her or his social or professional group(s). I have 
earlier addressed, albeit briefly, this objection and refer the reader to that 
discussion.111   With these objections in mind, however, I would now like 
to add to my earlier response to those having concerns about the supposed 
essentializing tendencies in my arguments. Specifically, the just-
introduced notion of rhetorical responsibility cannot rely on a very broad-
brush method of seeking an interactive diversity of knowledge through a 
presumption of the existence of differences in relevant knowledge based 
                                                 
110 Of course, internalized alignment with dominant values may come about even if a 
person does not belong (or is not recognized by herself or by others as belonging) to a 
dominant group. 
111 Scott, supra note 83 at 409-410. 
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solely on the existence of differences in social experience and disciplinary 
expertise. 
 
 In striving to secure institutional representation for a relevant 
diversity of habitus, we cannot adopt a position that does not also 
simultaneously acknowledge the irreducible individuality of 
mindsets and viewpoints of members of decision-making 
institutions. However much each of us operates with unquestioned, 
socially-(in)formed or discipline-(in)formed assumptions, we also 
have a (generally underused) capacity to engage in the constant 
formation and reformation of personal philosophies by engaging in 
varying degrees of critical reflection. Such capacity allows any 
given person not only to stray from but also to challenge the social 
influences to which that person is exposed.112 Even granting that 
life and career histories exert considerable influence on embedded 
premises as well as on conscious beliefs, personal histories can 
vary immensely even within what otherwise might seem a quite 
                                                 
112 An instructive example of judicial acknowledgement of how one’s personal identity 
affects one’s judging is found in the statement by Justice Gérard La Forest of the 
Supreme Court of Canada as he was announcing his retirement from the Court. While 
often labelled a conservative by many observers, he was quite activist the area of rights 
jurisprudence with respect to matters of privacy. He openly acknowledged how his votes 
in privacy-related cases are at some level an existential projection of his own identity: 
 I suppose I’m a very private person. I think there is a feeling in me that the 
individual is under grave danger with the coming of the new technologies where 
everything about you can be known, to your detriment, not to your help. 
He also frankly addressed his own character in terms of the influence of his small “i” 
ideology: 
 [I]f I had a perception, it would be a cautious liberal. I like to see things 
progress, but at the same time, one must be aware of the ground one is stepping on. . . . 
I’m conservative in the sense that I realize that the values around us are extremely 
important, but I’m also cognizant that one must face changes as they come along. 
Sean Fine, Top Court to Lose La Forest: Retirement of New Brunswick Francophone 
Puts Chrétien on the Spot, The Globe and Mail, August 27, 1997, A1 at A8. 
 This passage is instructive not only because it shows a judge who is aware of 
ideological perspective, but also because it conveys some sense that we are all, to varying 
degrees, constituted by different ideological strains and are in that sense (among other 
senses) dialogical beings. 
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homogenous social or professional group. As I argued in Bodies of 
Knowledge, however, one does not need to embrace essentialism 
as the basis for asserting the relevance of group-based 
experience.113 ‘Groupness’ of perspective is no less real for being 
contingent and for being non-comprehensive. Based on our 
knowledge of history and of current structures and power, we can 
make judgments about which differences are both especially 
pervasive in habitus formation and more salient than others from 
the perspective of the quality and legitimacy of institutional 
judgment in a given normative context. Assuming my arguments in 
Bodies of Knowledge on this score are persuasive, then it remains 
crucial that we seek to make sure that some perspectives are 
included through structured composition of decision-making 
bodies. Specifically, in light of the domination-challenging role of 
human rights discourse, there is reason to listen long and hard to 
experience and expertise that relates to the lives of the 
presumptively disadvantaged if we are to hope to fully embrace the 
imperative of taking rhetorical responsibility for our judgments.114  
 
In Bodies of Knowledge, I draw on the jury as an analogy for thinking 
about intra-institutional diversity. Returning to that analogy may help 
make the preceding points more concrete. In the jury context, affirmative 
                                                 
113 Scott, supra note 85 at 409. 
114 As I have put the matter before: 
 If we know that the world (including the world of the UN) is organized in such a 
way that certain perspectives are privileged, the call for inclusion appeals to the ideal of 
universality that is being compromised as the basis for an imperative need to introduce a 
kind of counter-privileging energy into the system. In this sense, we can justify a notion 
of the priority of perspectives as structured by an over-all substantive commitment to the 
elimination of suffering, of intolerance, of cruelty. 
Craig Scott, Commentary on Part IV: Human Rights, in United Nations Reform: Looking 
Ahead after Fifty Years 168, 168-69 (Eric Fawcett & Hannah Newcombe, eds., 1995). 
This does not mean absolute deference to what sufferers argue either to be the empirical 
truth, or the just normative prescription, but it does mean operating with a certain 
presumptive deference. See Scott, supra note 102 at 786-789: “From the vantage point of 
the underside of history, the intimate relationship between [sic] all human rights has a 
potential grounding in social experience and a resultant meaning that may be far ahead of 
understandings generated in less oppressive conditions.”  
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attention to diversity does not have to mean that we are seeking to make a 
jury even an approximate demographic microcosm of society, far less that 
we are seeking to translate societal numbers precisely and formalistically 
into proportionate numbers of “representatives” on the jury. For example, 
if, in a given trial, we have reason to believe that either homophobia or 
simple ignorance about sexual diversity might affect how a jury 
understands the evidence or how it looks on the victim, the accused, or 
witnesses, then sexuality is a salient demographic marker for purposes of 
taking seriously the normative function of a jury. However, we should be 
wary of assuming we have attended to the relevant concerns if we make 
sure one of the 12 jurors is an openly gay man on the ground that it is 
generally considered that only five to ten per cent of the general 
population are gay. Such a formalistic approach is akin to a theory of 
democratic legitimacy based solely on representation by population. While 
perhaps an advance on a concept of pure majoritarian democracy, it 
nonetheless fails to take into account the operations of power in society. 
We should instead be concerned to make sure that subordinated 
perspectives can hold their own in deliberations and thereby truly 
contribute to a dialogical deliberation.115 
 
At the same time, one cannot go so far in the direction of the inclusion of 
‘representatives’ of groups which are of central concern to human rights 
protections that we begin to think of inclusion as some kind of panacea. 
We cannot lose sight of the more broadly based normative function of the 
international human rights treaty bodies, that is, to exercise judgment in a 
way that has some chance of persuading all those affected by the 
judgments, including those who currently enjoy power and privilege in 
state-societies and who must be relied upon to change laws and practices 
in order to give effect to a view or concluding observation of a UN human 
rights committee. This is not to say that we should not assume (and even 
base legal presumptions around the fact) that the insights of the 
disadvantaged into the requirements of justice are generally more acute 
and accurate than those of the advantaged.  Nevertheless, judgments which 
aspire to be broadly persuasive cannot hope to be so if they are too easily 
viewed (and then discounted or even dismissed) as the direct emanations 
                                                 
115 Some studies suggest that perspectives need a critical mass to hold their own and to be 
taken seriously by the majority in deliberative processes. See for example Sheri L. 
Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury 83 Mich. L. Rev.1611 (1984). 
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of the will of the poor, of women, of sexual minorities, of minority ethnic 
and racial groups, or, indeed, of nutritionists, criminologists, or any other 
specific sector of non-legal expertise. Quite apart from this need to 
maintain society-wide political legitimacy as a precondition to institutional 
effectiveness, we cannot assume that any given claim advanced by a 
disadvantaged person or group translates – without more input, analysis 
and testing – into a universally valid moral (let alone legal) prescription. 
Even when we proactively compose an institution so as to inject “counter-
privileging energy” into that institution, the purpose is to make dialogical 
universalism more of a reality, not to assume normative outcomes before 
they have been tested through the interaction of diverse views and 
experiences.116 
 
Due to the rough and ready nature of representational indicators, it must be 
conceded that “representativity” can only ever be a presumption in terms 
of any given individual. There are men whose understanding of poverty, 
for example, is such that they have a much better understanding of certain 
dimensions of the experience of poor women than do many economically 
privileged women. If we were to accept a contention that something called 
“representativity” is an absolute requirement for good judgment, we would 
be denying any faith in the potential of human beings to arrive at 
understanding through communication across difference. Not only would 
we have embraced a problematic essentialism, but we would be 
undercutting the very reason diverse representation is justified in official 
institutions that exercise judgment on behalf of a wider community – 
namely, the enhancement of dialogical decision-making. 
 
Furthermore, constraints very often are such that affirmative attention to 
diversity during the structuring of the composition (and decision-making 
procedures) of a collective institution can easily result in only the most 
fragmentary approximations of an ideally diverse body. There are all kinds 
of practical reasons why the actual representation of the most relevant 
knowledge may not be feasible (or fully feasible) for a given institution or 
not feasible for a particular stretch of time. These reasons range from the 
small size of a decision-making body to the logistics of combining 
expertise and experience for some groups (whose disadvantage is so 
                                                 
116 Id. 
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extensive that educational deficits are endemic) and to the status-quo 
composition of bodies that (unlike juries) cannot be recomposed for each 
case. It therefore follows that we must simultaneously attend to other 
means of ensuring that perspectives not represented within the make-up of 
the bodies themselves are conveyed in meaningful ways to that body 
through the myriad kinds of procedures that lawyers both take for granted 
and are adept at designing (for example, the entering of evidence, the 
questioning of witnesses, the submission of intervenor briefs and the 
argument of counsel). There are potentially endless means to be creative 
about the way that perspectives may be heard by those called upon to 
judge.117 
 
Still, we cannot embrace this ideal of the communicability of human 
experience to such an extent that we lose sight of the simultaneous (and 
imperative) need to create the basic conditions of diversity that 
communicative interaction requires in order for us to attain the richest – 
and truest – understanding of a normative issue. We must equally be aware 
(and constantly remind ourselves) that to hear is not necessarily to listen. 
 
With this observation, I return to dialogue as the overarching justification 
for composing an institution on the basis of diversity criteria. I would go 
so far as to say that we are lost if we do not place considerable faith in a 
basic capacity for dialogue as both a common human attribute and a 
capacity we have a duty to develop. If such a capacity is there to be 
unlocked (as it were), an ethos of dialogue must be valued and cultivated 
as part and parcel of the creation of the optimal conditions for pursuing 
justice through collective deliberation. Alongside the enhancement of 
diversity, an emphasis must accordingly be placed on seeking out people 
with dialogical disposition: skilled and willing listeners; people aware of 
the subterranean influences of their own social backgrounds and individual 
life histories on their assumptions; people able to see many sides of an 
                                                 
117 In the international treaty body context, two of the most crucial procedures are (a) the 
structured receipt of information from the non-governmental sector and (b) interaction 
between the stories told in individual communications procedures and the more 
generalized state report process. On the latter in the context of the monitoring apparatus 
of the European Social Charter, see Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem, Constitutional 
Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?: Social Rights in a Future South African 
Constitution 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 107-08 (1992). 
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issue without thereby being paralysed by indecision; people who can 
advocate a position based on a deep commitment without being righteous 
or dogmatic in doing so; and so on. It would be a mistake to see such an 
ethos as an avenue to be pursued that is separate from attention to 
“representativity” (either of experience, or of expertise).  Rather both are 
best seen as co-criteria of any serious effort to enhance an institution’s 
authority. Just as a pluralistic knowledge base is crucial, UN human rights 
committees must, as much as possible, be composed of individuals who 
have some underlying disposition to listen to others who are differently 
situated, to strive to understand those perspectives and to bridge 
differences in a spirit of dialogue. 
 
 
VI. RELATING THE RHETORIC OF TRANSNATIONAL 
REPRESENTATIONAL AUTHORITY TO THE FORMAL 
POWER OF JUDGMENT  AND THE (IMAGINED) SCOPE 
OF COMMUNITY 
 
It is doubtful that Lauterpacht saw the need to accommodate state 
concerns and external or imposed judgment as a moral imperative as much 
as in terms of the pragmatic reality of perceptions of authority in light of 
the prevailing structure of international legal order. Even at the start of this 
new millenium, it is difficult to dismiss the normative dimension of state 
representation outright. Albeit to varying extents, states are perceived as 
the legal agents for a national society by the members of that society. The 
state is the normative space in which continuing acts of self-determining 
choices are made by historically situated political communities such that 
we may speak, as does Michael Walzer, of the “moral standing of 
states.”118 It is not only the governmental elites who need to feel that a 
judgment is, if not an extension of the national, at least an extension of the 
international to a significant degree rather than being so external as to be 
foreign. This relates quite closely to the work of theorists like Abdullahi 
                                                 
118 Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, in 
International Ethics 217 (Charles Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon, & John A. 
Simmonds eds., 1985).  
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An-Na’im whose work on international human rights emphasizes that 
standards must be perceived by those to whom they are applicable as self-
given norms such that the inside must merge with the outside through 
conjoined processes of intra-societal and cross-societal dialogue.119 The 
question is simultaneously one of legitimacy and effectiveness. Thus, one 
could say that one must be attentive to the need for a kind of local (to 
simplify for present purposes, national) ownership of international human 
rights norms. Many variables will be in play in influencing perceptions in 
different national cultures, but the eventuality that needs to be planned for 
is that a judgment in the name of international order may be pervasively 
regarded within a state as an external imposition. Such an external 
imposition is unlikely to result in the kind of internalization of norms that 
leads in the long term to the most deeply rooted compliance. Thus, there is 
a need to mitigate the problem. 
 
In that respect, one can go the route of Lauterpacht and try to incorporate 
the national in the international in order to make the external to some 
extent internal, that is, one can make the external less external, while 
retaining the legally imposed nature of the judgment. Here, the European 
Court of Human Rights represents an example, with its retention of 
national state representation (albeit through only one judge) and the power 
of binding judgment. Or, one can abandon any pretension that there can be 
meaningful national representation (thereby accepting the external nature 
of international judgment) but make the international judgment less than 
binding as such. That is, the role of imposing the interpretation of the 
external body can be left as a function of legal processes of conversion of 
the judgment into judgments internal to the state order itself. Here we 
have, in effect, the judging processes of the UN human rights treaty 
bodies. In this second approach, it is the substantive persuasiveness of 
given judgments and the general institutional authority acquired by virtue 
of the nature of the institution and its decision-making processes that enter 
into a dialogical relation with the national social, political and legal 
processes. 
 
There is one overarching variable that affects perceptions of both the 
inside/outside and the imposed/non-imposed tensions: the question of the 
                                                 
119 An-Na’im, supra note 87.   
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scope of community. If people feel that a judgment is grounded in a 
community with which those people feel a part, then judgment will, to that 
extent, move from the realm of the external into that of the internal; 
similarly, if judgment emanates from within the community of which the 
addressee feels a part, then the sense of imposition will give way to a 
sense of legitimate coercion in the name of the public good. This is of 
course one of the ways that the European Court has been able to forge 
greater and greater authority for itself, that is, by promoting and 
participating in a process of re-imagining itself less as an international 
court (despite its interstate treaty foundation) than as a constitutional court 
for a community called “Europe”.120 But this process of deepening of 
authority through community-widening has not been paralleled by a 
corresponding concern with transnationalizing authority through attention 
to the quality of dialogical interaction within the Court.121 The Court is left 
more often than not with its bare authority of legal position according to 
which it has the power to bind states to its judgments and appeal implicitly 
to deference owed to a judgment being brought to bear from within a 
shared community of the Court, the state-society and “Europe.” Yet, there 
are some, including several European Court of Human Rights judges with 
whom I have spoken in confidence over the years, who see the formal 
bindingness of the Court’s powers as having had a distinct conservatizing 
effect on judgments. Bindingness deprives the court of the ability to 
narrate a judgment that resonates with a human rights ethos, due to the 
constant attention that needs to be paid to the strategic wisdom of 
encroaching into still-sovereign space. The Court’s formal power to bind 
with its judgment does not allow – at least, has not been interpreted by the 
Court as allowing – an active role for the court by way of issuing robust 
‘judgments’ that rely on their persuasive value rather than on the bald 
juridical fact of their formal bindingness in order to have an impact on 
social and political debate in the states in question. On the rare occasion in 
                                                 
120 Loizidou v. Turkey, judgment of 23 March 1995, European Court of Human Rights, 
Series A, No. 310, para 93: “In addressing this issue the Court must bear in mind the 
special character of the Convention as an instrument of European public order (‘ordre 
public’) for the protection of individual human beings and its mission, as set out in 
Article 19, ‘to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High 
Contracting Parties’” 
121 See Scott, supra note 83, on European Court, including the thin beginnings of attention 
to gender representation. 
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which the Court has tried to finesse matters by bringing some normative 
influence to bear through the technique of judicial hinting about future 
rulings (for example, in the area of the recognition of transsexual self-
identity),122 these hints have always been forced into the mould of a 
warning about a future binding judgment. 
 
There are a good number of instances where it can be plausibly argued that 
the Court felt so constrained by the spectre of having to bind a state to a 
finding of a violation that they saw the issue of whether to adopt a 
purposive interpretation of a right as a choice between imposing their 
judgment and adopting a sound evolutionary interpretation.  One such 
instance is the role played by the Court in Johnston v Ireland in which the 
issue of whether the right to marry included a right to divorce was at 
stake.123 Not having the option (or, at least, not seeing itself as having the 
option) to pursue a course of injecting a European normative voice into the 
charged political debates in Ireland in a non-binding (recommendatory or 
advisory) fashion, the Court opted out entirely from probing the range of 
intersecting factors that spoke in favour of analysing the constitutional ban 
on divorce in Ireland as a European Convention human rights question 
(including such factors as women’s equality and consistency with earlier – 
and, it turned out, later – jurisprudence on a ‘freedom to X’ entailing also 
a ‘freedom not to X’). The normative debate in Ireland over divorce thus 
continued for a number of years, more or less uninfluenced by any 
European human rights perspective, before a referendum narrowly 
approved removal of the constitutional ban.  
 
It is not my purpose in this concluding section unequivocally to endorse 
non-binding judicial powers as the ideal partner of an enhancement of the 
diversity of knowledge within the processes of interpretive persuasion of 
international human rights adjudication. I do wish to signal what I see as a 
worthwhile direction for future theorizing to take, however.  At the 
moment, I limit myself to the claim that, at minimum, having such 
remedial flexibility could well increase the extent to which international 
bodies will be willing to adopt what they feel are the most justifiable 
                                                 
122 See Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986) and Cossey v. United 
Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990).  
123 Johnston v. Ireland, supra note 57. 
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human rights interpretations even when they are concerned about the fact 
or perception of undue intrusion into a national or subnational 
community’s political debate on an obviously controversial matter.  As for 
future avenues of exploration, the case for dialogical interaction and 
transnational community-building through non-binding forms of 
institutional judgment will likely be married to an argument that 
international bodies must nonetheless retain some form of legally 
determinative power when it comes to the question of evaluating whether 
a given state has complied with the primordial duty of creating the legal 
avenues in its domestic order that allow that state’s own judiciary full 
scope to consider whether the international human rights treaty in question 
has been breached. Such a twin-track approach (persuasive judgments on 
‘substantive’ matters and binding judgments on the ‘procedural’ question 
of whether domestic law adequately gives legal effect to the treaty in its 
domestic order) will, it seems to me, create the most promising avenue for 
combining effectiveness and legitimacy in international human rights 
protection. In this way, within an overarching framework of dialogical 
universalism, we will have moved from rhetoric to representation and back 
to rhetoric again in the quest for a theory of international interpretive 
authority that can inform the institutional design of any future 
international human rights court.124 
 
 
                                                 
124 Although the point cannot be elaborated upon here, the most promising 
conceptualization to date of the linkages between international human rights treaty law 
and the domestic orders of states parties would seem to have been provided by 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, “The Domestic Application of the 
[International] Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]”, General Comment 
No. 9, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24, December 1998.    
